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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
“BRUTES” AND “PACIFISTS” MEET POLITICS OF THE ACT: 
 VIOLENCE, NONVIOLENCE AND PREFIGURATION 
 
 
 
 
İlkim Karakuş 
 
 
Cultural Studies, M.A. Thesis, 2015 
 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Faik Kurtulmuş 
 
 
 
 
 
 Keywords: Violence, nonviolence, prefiguration, militancy, resistance 
 
 
 
In an attempt to problematize the violence/nonviolence binary and the dogmatic forms 
they take in the context of resistance, this thesis starts by exploring the literature on 
nonviolence, and violence in revolutionary rhetoric. After a critical review of the 
literature, it turns to current debates on violence in confrontational militant praxis, 
which refers to nonlethal use of violence in the context of protest, such as property 
destruction and clashes with the police. This thesis argues that the confrontational 
militancy produces a “hardcore habitus” and sacrificial subjectivities fed by valorized 
notions of suffering. Identifying the dependence on the opponent – mostly, the state- 
and its violence within confrontational politics as the necessary conditions for the 
emergence of “hardcore habitus”, sacrificial subjectivities, and dogmatic forms of 
associations disabling critical commitments, this study then introduces prefiguration as 
an alternative approach. It argues that prefigurative politics secures the room for 
criticism, and precludes the ontological dependence on the opponent due its direct-
action-orientation and emphasis on micropolitics. Finally, drawing on the different 
configurations of success, temporality and the denial of an instrumental reasoning in 
prefiguration, this thesis discusses militancy within the prefigurative frame.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
 
 “AYILAR”, “PASİFİSTLER” VE EYLEM ODAKLI SİYASET: ŞİDDET, 
ŞİDDETSİZLİK VE PREFİGÜRASYON 
 
 
 
 
İlkim Karakuş 
 
 
Kültürel Çalışmalar, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015 
 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Faik Kurtulmuş 
 
 
 
 
 
 Anahtar sözcükler: Şiddet, şiddetsizlik, prefigürasyon, militanlık, direniş 
 
 
 
Bu tez, direniş bağlamında ortaya çıkan şiddet/şiddetsizlik ikiliğini ve aldıkları 
dogmatik formları problematize etmek amacıyla devrimci retorikte şiddet ve 
şiddetsizlik literatürlerini incelemektedir. Literatürün eleştirel incelemesinin ardından 
protesto bağlamında öldürme amacı taşımayan mülke zarar ve polisle çatışmaya tekabül 
eden yüzleşmeci militan praksisteki güncel şiddet tartışmalarına dönmektedir. Bu 
çalışmada, yüzleşmeci militanlığın acı çekmeyi yücelterek “hardcore habitus” ve fedai 
öznellikler ürettiği öne sürülmektedir. Yüzleşmeci politikanın öngördüğü bir karşıta –
çoğunlukla devlete- ve onun şiddetine bağımlı olma halini “hardcore habitus”, fedai 
öznellikler ve eleştirelliğe alan bırakmayan dogmatik ilişkilenme biçimlerinin gerekli 
koşulları olarak tanımladıktan sonra, alternatif bir yaklaşım olarak prefigürasyon 
önerilmektedir. Prefigüratif politikanın doğrudan eylem odaklılığı ve mikrosiyaset 
vurgusu sebebiyle eleştirel bakış açısına alan sağladığını ve bir karşıta olan ontolojik 
bağımlılığı engellediği öne sürülmektedir. Son olarak, prefigürasyonun araçsal 
gerekçelendirmenin reddi ile zamansallığı ve kazanımı farklı şekillerde 
tanımlamasından yola çıkarak, prefigüratif çerçevede militanlığa dair bir tartışma 
yürütülmektedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
“For how many of you is politics a responsibility? 
Something you engage in because you feel you should, […] 
out of a sense of obligation? […] Could it be that is, above 
all, a feeling of guilt that drives you to fulfill your ‘duty’ to 
be politically active? Perhaps you spice up your ‘work’ by 
trying (consciously or not) to get in trouble with the 
authorities, to get arrested: not because it will practically 
serve your cause, but to make things more exciting, to 
recapture a little of the romance of turbulent times now long 
past.” 
Nadia, C., Your Politics Are Boring as Fuck 
 
“We come to love our left passions and reasons, our left 
analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing 
world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms or 
the future that would be aligned with them.” 
Wendy Brown, Resisting Left Melancholy 
 
 
 
“Gezi”1 came at a time when my involvement in activism resonated with what 
Nadia C. depicts above, a duty, an obligation to get out, confront the police, run or fight, 
come back home. The political field as such resembled a ritual site, where we 
reciprocated affirmation of activist identities. While at times our “ritualized 
confrontations” (Sullivan, 2005a) had results, more often than not, I felt that all we did 
was to show each other that we cared, cared enough to get out, walk and shout.  
And given what counted as “resisting” was defined by our clashes with the 
police and the extent of our pushing them off, affirmation was a violent affair. The 
revolutionary rhetoric constructing our actions as parts of an unfolding history, through 
which we accumulated towards the emancipated future, bonded emancipation with 
suffering inflicted on our bodies. Yet, it seemed to me, the violence inflicted by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See Özkırımlı, 2014 and Fraksiyon Gezi Kitabı (2014). 
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police on our bodies, ceteris paribus, did not really change anything, except the scars 
and the injuries. And at some point, the regular resistance sports of being gassed and 
chased, on my part, certainly felt neither emancipatory nor revolutionary. It was not that 
I was a “pacifist”, in the pejoratively used sense of the word, but occasionally I was 
tired, exhausted, overwhelmed and ultimately alienated by these never-ending 
confrontations and the revolutionary rhetoric surrounding it. Should our actions be 
always accumulating towards a future end, which, we probably won’t live long enough 
to see anyway? Should politics be necessarily negative, a big “NO!” and emerge from 
guilt, dissent, contention? 
Then came Gezi, bringing along the “many yeses” following the big “NO!” 
(Sitrin & Azzelini, 2014). Therapeutically washing away the residues of “left 
melancholy” in my activist psyche, Gezi presented itself not only as the embodiment of 
a different world, but also a different political praxis. All the familiar notions engrained 
in my political vocabulary were there, tested through experimentation: mutual aid, 
reciprocity, autonomy, commons, diversity, participatory democracy, voluntary 
divisions of labor… Problems were there of course, as they usually are. Yet, it was 
nothing like the activism that I was accustomed with. Still, “it felt politically excellent” 
(Mason, 2014:151). 
A few steps down the road from the park, on the other hand, was rather familiar. 
Women and men fighting with the state’s police forces at the barricades. But this 
familiarity felt different. Not like the rallies, marches and demonstrations that I had 
been part of, which (almost) everyone knew would end up in confrontational street 
fighting. This was different. But how? What made it different? I remember thinking to 
myself, because now this violence has an actual task, we are defending Gezi, making it 
possible. To me, along with many others, it was common sense that Gezi would not be 
possible without the barricades, and those standing there, telling the state that we 
weren’t willing to leave without putting up a fight. 
Yet, for some, Gezi was an act of “civil disobedience”, one that operated 
through nonviolence. A flyer was put into circulation, roughly translated as “Don’t 
come here you brute!”: 
To those who, 
Are throwing rocks to the police, 
Are tearing up their surroundings, 
Are committing partisanship, 
DON’T COME HERE YOU BRUTE! 
! 3!
We are in the right, 
We don’t want to lose our rightness. 
Don’t go along, but warn! 
#thisisacivildisobedience2 
 
The authoritarian dictation of the flyer was so severe that my share of criticism 
for militant praxis swiftly evaded. What convinced these people that they had a right to 
define what “Gezi” was? Who were they to decide who could come, let alone kicking 
people out? To my perception, without us, the “brutes” Gezi would not have been 
possible. 
Suffocated by the assertiveness of the flyer, which was widely circulated, I 
walked towards the barricades, feeling the urge to show my solidarities, where I found 
other fellow “brutes”, with their faces turned white with the solution used to neutralize 
pepper gas’s effects, and their hoarse voices. The crowd around the barricades was 
rattling, a bit more than the usual. As I was moving down the street, I heard an 
exhilarated young man, declaring that we were about to take Beşiktaş.3 But what were 
we supposed to do with Beşiktaş? Not only were the police more violent around 
Beşiktaş, increasing the risks of losses and injuries, of which we already had too much, 
but also Beşiktaş was strategically useless. Gezi Park already had a functioning system, 
in which we all could find a space to be. We didn’t need more space. And to my 
perception, we definitely didn’t need to “take” Beşiktaş. Not being able to keep it to 
myself, I asked to a friend nearby, “But why? Why do we need to take Beşiktaş?”. “To 
kick the police out, and expand” answered my friend signaling the coming of yet 
another familiar discussion, “we are fighting here, this is not like playing in the garden”. 
“But then what?”, I asked back, “Are we going to expand till we cannot?”.  
Then came a long speech, about the presumptuousness of “pacifism”; the right 
to and the necessity of violence; and that it was treason to the cause (whatever the cause 
was) to question the right to and the necessity of violence. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Polise taş atanlara 
Çevreye saldıranlara 
Partizanlık yapanlara sesleniyoruz! 
SEN GELME ULAN AYI! 
Haklıyız, haksız duruma düşmek istemiyoruz. 
Uyma, uyar! 
#bubirsivildirenis 
 
3 Beşiktaş was at the time the location of then prime-minister Erdoğan’s 
residence.  
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There was nothing I disagreed about his critique of nonviolence, our right to 
violence against the police, and about the contexts that could evoke the necessity of it. 
But why was it treason? Was our “cause” so fragile that it would shatter with a simple 
question? How come my questioning of the necessity to “take” Beşiktaş had made me a 
“pacifist”? And finally, what was wrong with “playing in the garden”? Need political 
praxis always be heroic, militant and confrontational? 
And there I was. Unable to decide whether to feel guilty as they were fighting an 
honorable war, and we the “pacifists” were playing in the garden; or to be mad at these 
“brutes” who knew nothing but violence, and who kept infantilizing other means of 
political praxis. The positions for nonviolence and violence, it seemed, were solidified, 
disabling a supportive and critical commitment, and I had to make a choice. The options 
I had were limited with “brutes” and “pacifists”, and the contract said, “no questions 
asked”. 
But why was a position, while acknowledging the necessity and legitimacy of 
violence in some instances, that could also keep the right to question it was not 
possible? When did being critical of exclusive nonviolence become substitution for 
uncritical defense of exclusively violent means? Why were the options limited to either 
violence or nonviolence? Could we not have some of both? 
Coinciding with the phase that I should start thinking about my thesis, I was 
intrigued by this binary of violence/nonviolence.4 Even if my interest in this binary 
materialized in Gezi, I did not want to study Gezi. It was not Gezi that I wanted to 
understand. I was interested in the affective and discursive associations of violence, 
which somehow produced a binary, which then initiated an “activist refusal” to criticize, 
ask questions and a rather reflexive position, echoing what Ortner called as 
“ethnographic refusal”: “the impulse to sanitize the internal politics of the dominated” 
(1995:179). And there emerged the questions that inspired what this thesis draws on: 
What is it about the political framings and approaches to violence that enables this 
binary? What is it about the way violence is allowed/disallowed that produces this 
“activist refusal” and the dogmatic forms of commitment? And would it be possible to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 What I refer to as violence accords with the context from which the questions 
driving this thesis are born: nonlethal violence in protest, clashes with the police 
and selective property destruction. What I refer to as nonviolence is not the 
deployment of means that are not violent, but the generalization of nonviolence 
norms as prohibition of violent means. 
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initiate a different approach that goes beyond this binary and provides room for 
commitment without giving up critical assessments? 
Chapters 2 and 3 trace the question of what enables the binary and the 
accompanying dogmatic forms of violence/nonviolence. The binary is first and 
foremost sustained by construction of violent and nonviolent means as exclusively 
separate paths. For proponents of nonviolence, such exclusion is overt; it works through 
the open prohibition of violent means (Chapter 2). The exclusion of nonviolent means 
within defense of violence, on the other hand, is achieved rather subtly. Through the 
discursive associations between violence and radicalness, and the revolutionary 
rhetoric, militant praxis appropriates a priori revolutionary credentials, rendering 
alternative means inferior. The argumentations made on behalf of violent acts as 
accumulating towards revolution, in collaboration with the “inevitable instinct to 
identify with the most radical [read: violent] option” (Graeber, 2009:225), initiate a 
dogmatic form of militant praxis (Chapter 3). In either case, binary produces dogmatic 
forms of commitment, hierarchical positions, and partisan silences. The ethical 
reasonings behind the commission or prohibition of violence, in other words, besides 
establishing a binary that precludes and limits critical assessments, also produces 
hierarchies among alternative means, and subjects deploying them. 
Besides the two spectrums of a binary, both of which have problems of their 
own (detailed in Chapter 2 and 3), as this thesis opened up, another theme became 
significant; the dependence on the opponent and its violence for defining what 
constitutes success. For nonviolent praxis, the search and desire for nonviolent forms of 
protest offers two options. First, to limit actions beforehand with what the law and the 
state have given permission for (and hope that they won’t break it). Second is to break 
the law, and receive the police violence in hopes that the suffering they inflict would 
contribute positively, either through producing compassion in police forces or third 
parties, or polishing the higher ground of righteousness, as in “not having returned their 
violence back”. The problem with the first option is that it limits agency beforehand. It 
reduces the political field to “what has been permitted”, which sounds counter to the 
idea of resistance as an act aiming for liberation. In presupposing docility, it tames the 
emancipatory potential beforehand. With the second option, police violence assumes an 
affirmative task, a ground upon which the subjectivities could be validated. Put 
differently, police violence becomes an essential part of what affirms the righteousness. 
Constructing a discursive link between victimization and righteousness, it comes to a 
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point where the violence inflicted contributes positively to what is defined as a 
successful political act.  
For militant praxis, the discursive link between radicalness and violence 
similarly presupposes the opponent, the reciprocation of whose violence lies at the core. 
The centrality of the sporadic clashes with the police to the configuration of what 
constitutes politics, in other words, posits the police as an equally necessary part of 
resistance, of the emancipatory process. The violence inflicted upon resistant bodies 
then assumes a similar affirmative task, rendering the opponent and its violence central. 
In short, the activist habitus, formed through confrontational encounters, promotes 
sacrificial subjectivities and works towards the construction of the state as an 
inextricable component of political praxis, and its violence as an affirmative ground. 
The political conduct is then conceptualized as intrinsically dependent on the opponent 
and its violence. And in either case, it comes to a point that “the parameters of protest 
are inexorably set, not by the challengers, but by the state itself” (Peterson, 2006:73). 
Taking a step back, then, the formation of the binary as choosing among the 
limited options of either to reciprocate, receive or evade state’s violence is dependent on 
the reliance on confrontation. That is, it is the confrontational framing that makes the 
violence/nonviolence binary possible: since it is, more often than not, evident that 
confrontation will result in state’s violence, the question inevitably becomes how to 
respond to it. The problem for politics then becomes how to manage state’s violence, 
and how to articulate the response into a positively contributive force. The articulation 
of response as contributive, either militant or nonviolent, takes dogmatic forms, denying 
critical approaches. If the dogmatic forms disabling room for critique are enabled by the 
binary, which in turn is enabled by a confrontational frame, would a move beyond 
confrontational praxis, an alternative mode of politics, perhaps make solution 
unnecessary? 
If, in other words, confrontation produces the conditions for the emergence of 
the violence/nonviolence binary and their dogmatic forms, then a different frame that 
does not presuppose the opponent for articulating what constitutes success should be 
conceptually able to forestall the emergence of monolithic and binary configurations of 
violence and nonviolence. But since politics does not necessarily abide by their 
conceptual formations, inclusion of principles that ensure room for critique at the 
empirical level would still be necessary. And this is what Chapter 4 and 5 work on 
respectively. Chapter 4 outlines prefigurative politics, which operates through the idea 
! 7!
of “acting as if one was free” and enacting the ideals in the present through 
experimentation. Chapter 5 analyzes militancy within the prefiguration frame, and 
argues that, despite being incapable of providing an ultimate solution, prefiguration 
offers a ground that secures the right to ask questions. As a form of engagement that 
does not presuppose confrontation, prefiguration conceptually precludes the conditions 
for the emergence of the ontological dependence on the opponent and its violence. Due 
to the inclusion of autonomy and anti-oppression as part of the ideals and relevant 
criteria, prefiguration also secures the ground for a critical commitment and room for 
questions. Acknowledging the discrepancies between the conceptual and empirical 
levels, the chapter concludes by highlighting potential problems associated with 
violence within the prefiguration framework. 
As it has been clear by now, this thesis does not attempt to offer an answer to the 
question of violence/nonviolence. The question of violence/nonviolence is inevitably 
contextual, making a final and definite answer impossible and the claim of having found 
one sound absurd. Even with the relatively less complicated matter of property-damage, 
“the question can only be answered by asking other questions. We must ask: What 
objects will be damaged? For what purpose? Using what kind of force? Will any living 
being be injured in any way?” (jones, 2006:324).  
While this thesis is ultimately about a critique of violence, this critique is 
oriented towards a principled defense of militant political praxis. Differing from the 
conventional defenses of nonviolence, the criteria adopted for the critique of violence is 
one that looks at the social conditions of the possibility of violence. I adopt “social 
conditions of the possibility” perspective from Bourdieu’s The Scholastic Point of View 
(1990), where he uses it to highlight the unequal conditions of access to the scholastic 
point of view. Rather than simply pointing to the social conditions, he also adds the 
possibility, which is significant, because it allows us to go beyond the notion of stable 
positions, and also to take the process in which those positions are formed into account. 
The social conditions of the possibility of violence intends to evoke a sense that not 
only pays attention to acts of violence at a particular moment, but also keeping the 
question of what enabled their emergence in mind and asking: “under what conditions 
did the possibility for the destruction of property as a confrontation with capital arise”? 
(Cross, 2003:8). 
The social conditions allow for an approach that does not take violence in a 
vacuum, which is most of the time the case for the critique of violence by defendants of 
! 8!
nonviolence. The different subject positions bring along different social conditions and 
possibilities, rendering nonviolence possible for some, as making it impossible for 
others.  The focus on social conditions and the possibilities designated by them, in this 
sense, ensures the inclusion of context as opposed to a decontextualized critique derived 
from a generalized application of nonviolence criterion. Within this frame, the criticism 
oriented towards violent resistors, for instance, misses the state’s violence in the name 
of the capital, which has made the resistant violence possible in the first place. Taken as 
such, the social conditions of the possibility of violence against capitalism is dependent 
on the capital and the state.  
The focus on context, or social conditions, on the other hand, risks initiating a 
frame that disregards the possibility aspect. Particularly relevant for the defenses of 
violence is the tendency to translate the social conditions into a non-negotiable license 
for violence. While the emphasis on social conditions succeeds in allocating state’s and 
capital’s responsibility for the emergence of violence, it comes at the expense of 
agencies and agents’ responsibilities. The social conditions of the possibility of 
violence, however, implies the existence of alternatives. While it is one thing to say that 
the social conditions of the possibility of resistant violence is dependent on the state and 
capital, it is quite another to construct resistant violence as knee-jerk reactions to an 
over-determining context. 
An approach that pays attention to the social conditions of the possibility of 
violence, then, allows a better allocation of responsibilities, where neither state nor the 
resistant actors are exempted from accountability, responsibility, and accordingly 
criticism. It also offers a position that, while remaining critical of violent political 
conduct, does not adhere to a rather abstracted, sterile critique of violence that 
disregards the social conditions of the possibility of its emergence. 
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CHAPTER 2 !
 
NONVIOLENCE 
 
 
 
 
“If you turn the other cheek, you will get a harder blow on it 
than you got on the first one. This does not always happen, 
but it is to be expected and you ought not to complain if it 
does happen.” 
George Orwell, Lear, Tolstoy, and the Fool 
 
 
 
 Defenses of nonviolence are conventionally divided into two lines; “principled” 
and “instrumentalist” uses of nonviolence (Atack, 2011; Martin, 1989; Mueller, 2004; 
Sharp, 1959). Principled arguments for nonviolence “claim validity independent of 
action’s outcome or concrete circumstances” (Mueller, 2004:140) whereas instrumental 
arguments for nonviolence “depend for their validity on a consideration of the outcome 
of the action” (ibid.:141). Stated as such, principled use of nonviolence, mostly linked 
to Gandhi and King Jr, is more concerned with the means adopted and the moral quality 
of the means adopted. Instrumental use, mostly linked to Gene Sharp, on the other hand, 
focuses on the ends and the efficiency of nonviolent means. However, neither 
arguments about means and ends, nor morality and efficacy are mutually exclusive or 
mutually exhaustive within these two lines. The argument that nonviolence is more 
open to participation, for instance, is both supported with claims regarding efficacy and 
morality. The moral aspect focuses on the democratic nature of nonviolence, and the 
efficacy aspect focuses on the impact of broader participation on the chances of success.  
Since my concern is to tackle the arguments, rather than defining the two camps 
of nonviolence, this chapter is organized with regard to the ways in which the 
arguments about efficacy and moral quality are grounded, rather than situating them 
into analytically separate categories of “principled” or “instrumental”. For instance, 
while the inseparability of the means and ends is conventionally located into the 
! 10!
principled camp associated with morality, here, I consider the inseparability of means 
and ends as a matter of efficacy. The way I use efficacy refers to nonviolence’s capacity 
to work as well as to its practical contributions to the desired outcome. Moral quality is 
used to include arguments that situate nonviolence as morally superior, and the moral 
code that “violence is always wrong”. 
 
 
 
2.1 Consent Theory of Power 
(Dear Power, Can I please take my consent back?) 
 
 
 
The articulation of nonviolence works through “consent theory of power” 
according to which a society consists of “rulers” and “subjects”, and power of the rulers 
derives from and depends on the consent provided by the subjects in the form of 
“obedience and cooperation” (Sharp, 1973:12). Nonviolent action is construed as a 
“method of waging conflict” by the means of withdrawing consent (Martin, 2001:29). 
The idea is to introduce a conflict using the threat force of depriving the ruler of 
consent, and hence of power.  
The ways in which the ruler is deprived of consent include acts of omission and 
commission. Acts of omission constitute the disruption of obedience and refer to the 
refusal to perform acts “expected by custom, or required by law” (Sharp, 1959:44). Acts 
of commission constitute the disruption of cooperation and refer to taking part in 
actions that are prohibited by custom or law (ibid.:45). These acts work through the 
mechanisms of conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. 
Conversion refers to “changing the opponents’ opinion or beliefs”; accommodation is 
“compromising to gain part of one’s objectives”; nonviolent coercion is “forcing the 
opponents to grant the demands”; and disintegration is “causing the opponents’ system 
or government to fall completely apart” (Sharp, 1996:234). 
These mechanisms, however, are not pre-defined goals or strategies, rather they 
refer to the ways in which nonviolent actions work. Therefore, it is safe to argue that all 
mechanisms operate within the current frame of order and aim to provoke changes 
without necessarily introducing a challenge to the basis of the structure. Even if 
“disintegration” implies a challenge to the structure or the system, it is ultimately taken 
to be an extreme application of coercion working through the use of “threat power”, that 
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is, the expression of the “capacity to exercise coercive power” (Atack, 2011:122). The 
system, and its contribution to the problems at hand, is not part of the agenda. What this 
mechanism enables is located in the threat function of its ability to disintegrate the 
system. Consent theory, accordingly, even when works through the disintegration of the 
system, is interested in “transforming it (and converting the people in power)” 
(Gelderloos, 2007:24) rather than eliminating the system as a whole. 
The understanding of power in consent theory uses individuals, their consent 
and agencies as the basis for analysis. Despite the rulers-subjects classification’s 
implication of power as “a monolithic entity residing in the person” (Martin, 1989:214), 
for consent theory of power, power is pluralistic and resides within social groups and 
institutions. According to consent theory, various social groups hold power, to which 
Sharp refers to as “loci of power” (2005:27) and it is their cooperation and consent that 
accumulates power in the ruler. The subjects’ decision to deprive the ruler of their 
consent challenges the regular functioning of the loci of power and forces the opponent, 
the ruler, to alter their behavior. However, despite the argument that power does not 
reside in the ruler as a material possession, consent theory still relies on an individualist, 
voluntaristic, actor-based understanding because of its emphasis on consent and choice 
(Martin, 1989; McGuinness, 1993). Even if power is not taken into hand as something 
the rulers possess, the actions are ultimately constructed as dependent on the subjects 
and rulers. Power, taken as such, is an individual matter. 
Understanding of power as deriving from individuals and consent initiate three 
problems. First, power, understood as functioning through threat force and capacity to 
convince or enforce, assumes a communicable opponent and a shared moral/political 
view, which are qualities of individuals. The relations of power are also constituted 
through structures, such as capitalism, and patriarchy, which do not necessarily provide 
an observable opponent to be deprived from the consent (Martin, 1989; McGuinness, 
1993). The form of action proposed by consent theory fails to provide a compelling 
picture of the ways in which structural components are to be taken into consideration. 
More importantly, in constituting the opponent as communicable, consent theory in a 
way de-politicizes power. The idea that convincing or enforcing the opponent, mostly 
the state, could achieve the objectives obscures the power imbalance, as well as falls 
short in explaining the ways in which relations of power are constituted.  
Second, power construed as results of the choices of the individuals disregards 
structures’ relation to agency (Atack, 2006; Atack, 2011; Martin, 1989; McGuinness, 
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1993; Ryan, 2002). Production of consent as an individual matter overlooks the ways in 
which structures or systems “limit the capacity for individual decision-making” 
(Burrowes, 1996:90, quoted in Atack, 2006:91). The production of consent, that is to 
say, cannot be taken into hand as a sole matter of individual choice. Even if attempts 
have been made to incorporate Gramscian notion of hegemony to deepen the 
understanding of consent (Atack, 2006; Martin, 1989), Gramsci’s approach is not 
compatible with the individualistic approach of consent theory. Hegemony, according to 
Gramsci, produces consent through normalizing the current order, or by rendering the 
alternative impossible. Consent in Gramscian understanding is manufactured socially, 
politically and historically by the dominant social class; it is not a matter of individual 
choice. As opposed to the authentic form of consent offered by consent theory that 
could be given and taken back; Gramsci situates the formation of consent into the socio-
political relations between social classes, power relations and structures surrounding 
them (1971). 
Finally, the rulers-subjects classification disregards the complex relations 
through which subject positions are constituted (Atack, 2006; Atack, 2011; Ryan, 
2002). The subject positions are constituted by the intersections of different relations of 
power and structures, such as class, race, gender, ability, sexuality etc. (See Bernstein, 
2005; Collins, 2009; Naples, 2008). Yet, the formulation of subject-ruler classification 
within nonviolence is incapable of working through the multiple axis of relations, where 
the positions of subjects and rulers are, accordingly, multiple too. The rigidly defined 
positions of subjects and rulers, in other words, are inadequate for representing the 
complexity of the formation of subject positions. Such static formulation inevitably 
necessitates a particular line of power (or structure) to be designated as the criteria for 
the definition of positions.  Which line of power (or structure) will be used to assign the 
subject-ruler position, however, remains an important, yet unanswered, question. 
 
 
 
2.2 Violence is always wrong; nonviolence is morally superior 
(Dignity of the bruise) 
 
 
 
Arguments for nonviolence attempt to situate nonviolence as more than the 
negative definition of sole opposition to violence. These arguments not only degrade the 
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use of violence, but also posit nonviolence as superior. While the arguments against 
violence in themselves work to constitute nonviolence as the better option, the emphasis 
on the “strengthening of the capacity for popular power and popular resistance against 
oppression and injustice” works to provide a positive definition (Atack, 2011:8). 
Besides the problems associated with the use of violence, focusing on the superiority of 
nonviolent means work against the representation of nonviolence as the passive 
rejection of violence. Focus on the positive qualities of nonviolence besides and beyond 
its critique of and opposition to violence, in other words, construes nonviolence as an 
active form of political engagement. In this line, the moral superiority of nonviolence is 
situated as more than the act of refraining from violent actions. The arguments “for 
nonviolence” and “against violence”, in other words, work simultaneously to reject 
violence and to posit nonviolence as the better option. The moral superiority of 
nonviolence includes arguments that (1) violence is always wrong, (2) nonviolence 
provides room for error, (3) suffering and self-sacrifice are redemptive tools, (4) 
nonviolence is open to everyone and hence more democratic, and (5) violence is the tool 
of the enemy, which would eliminate the differences between the “moral us” and the 
“enemy”, and would only contribute to the opponent’s system. 
The first and most basic argument against violence almost goes without saying: 
violence is morally wrong. What makes it important in terms of the defendants of 
nonviolence is the adding of the “always”. Drawing on religious, ethic, and moral 
concerns, the proponents of nonviolence conclude that violence is always morally 
wrong. As the proponents of violence argue that violence in particular circumstances 
may not necessarily be wrong, the proponents of nonviolence oppose such 
legitimization to different extents. Circumstances or context, in this understanding, 
cannot be considered as relevant criteria to render violent means morally appropriate. 
Violence, in short, is considered as morally wrong regardless of the context and 
adherence to nonviolence is asserted as the sole possible course of action within the 
limits of morality. 
As sometimes room is provided for violence in the cases of self-defense and for 
the benefit of third parties at stake, the dominant tendency is to focus on the alternatives 
of violence, such as acts of omission, commission and self-sacrifice (Sharp, 1959). The 
approaches of Gandhi and King Jr regarding self-defense and circumstances in which 
'innocent' third parties are at stake do not provide a coherent position. Both have 
different, sometimes contradicting statements regarding self-defense and “innocent” 
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third parties. Gandhi, for example, has argued that what is of importance is the 
intentions behind the act and if one acts violent out of compassion, then the act is not 
violence in the sense of “evil” (Haksar, 2012). However, he has also argued that the 
nobler thing to do would be let oneself get killed than to harm the aggressor regardless 
of the consequences it would bring, which includes harm to third parties (ibid.). King Jr, 
in a similar vein, insistently argues for “turning the other cheek”, yet, he not only argues 
that self-defense is considered as “moral and legal” by all societies, but he also states 
that “self-defense, even involving weapons and bloodshed, has never been condemned 
by Gandhi, who sanctioned it for those unable to master pure nonviolence” (King Jr, 
1959:3). Only Tolstoy provides a coherent stance regarding self-defense and third 
parties at stake by calling for a complete pacifism on the grounds that it is never quite 
possible to know whether the “aggressor will carry out his [sic] intentions” (Tolstoy, 
1986:30-31, quoted in Haksar, 2012:309). 
The claim that violence is always wrong is also supported by a kind of “ethical 
and epistemological humility” (Atack, 2011:18), which argues that since no one can be 
entirely and absolutely sure whether their actions are rightful or not, by voluntary self-
suffering, nonviolent action makes sure that only the agent suffers in the case of a 
wrongdoing (Gandhi, 2001:17; King Jr, 1991:47). Because violence is wrong, and 
because “what appears as truth to one may appear to be error to the other” (Gandhi, 
2001:6), refraining from violent acts provides room for error by making sure that no one 
other than the person acting out would embrace the possible suffering as a result of 
possible errors. 
But more importantly, such moral claim works through decontextualization, 
which refers to disregarding different material, affective and social possibilities that 
different subject positions entail. While decontextualization is the whole point of the 
claim that “violence is always morally wrong”, the differences in the severities of the 
extents of being the recipient end of violence is the grounds for the criticism that 
nonviolent thought obscures the fact that nonviolence is a luxury not available to 
everyone (Churchill, 2007; Gelderloos, 2007 & 2013). As some subject positions may 
afford nonviolent forms of resistance, for others stakes are high and nonviolence as a 
form may not be available. Taking a position towards violence in a vacuum trivializes 
the social conditions of the possibility of violence, that is, the context in which violence 
becomes possible. The trivialization occurs through rendering the underlying structural 
inequalities bringing about such different conditions and possibilities irrelevant. For 
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instance, the application of same criteria at the expense of context in both cases of a 
police attack with tear gas and a military attack with bombs makes it harder to talk 
about the significant patterns through which some get the tear gas whereas some get the 
bombs. Decontextualization, in other words, risks obviating the discussion of the social, 
historical and political aspects designating different experiences to different subject 
positions. Nonviolence, first, constructs the different experiences as irrelevant, and 
second, disallows the discussion of how these different experiences have been possible 
in the first place. 
Nonviolence theory forestalls this tension by extolling suffering and self-
sacrifice. The suffering is taken to evoke compassion, which denotes privilege (Berlant, 
2004:4), which in turn further normalizes the unequal subject positions and the power 
imbalance enabling them. The premise that violence is always wrong is incorporated 
into the argument that it is better to be the recipient rather than the perpetrator of 
violence (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; Gregg, 1960; King Jr, 1957 & 1959; Sharp, 
1959). But similar to the way in which nonviolence was formed as more than the 
opposition to violence, the positive value of being the recipient of violence is also 
constructed as more than a choice between perpetrating or receiving violence. Suffering 
and self-sacrifice, within nonviolence thought, are not by-products or risks to be taken 
into consideration; rather they themselves are tools for initiating change. Referred to as 
“redemptive suffering” (Atack, 2011), bearing with, if not welcoming, the 
consequences5 of one’s actions fulfill two tasks; first, it represents “the sincerity of 
commitment to the case”, and second, “becomes a major component of the impact of 
nonviolent action upon the opponent or the oppressor” (ibid.:17). The redemptive force 
located in suffering as a way to “‘melt the hearts’ of the opponents” (Martin, 2001:33), 
however, turns into a process of glorification of suffering that romanticizes, valorizes 
and normalizes subordination and relations of power. Together with the discourse of 
choice and the constitution of “moral self”, the understanding of redemptive suffering 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 I am hesitant to call the suffering coming from the opponent as “consequence” 
for it implies a cause-effect relation and situates the receiving end of the violence 
as sharing the responsibility. Such conceptualization also relies on an 
understanding of “legitimate authority” which holds the right to act in return. 
Despite the fact that such framing contradicts to the one I adopt, the proponents of 
nonviolence conceptualize it as “outcome” or “consequence” and I stick to their  
conceptualization. 
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“perpetuates submissive and dependent orientations that have been imposed on 
subordinate groups for too long” (ibid.:33-34). 
The discourse of choice within consent theory works further to normalize the 
violence of the opponent for in particular circumstances acts of omission and 
commission equals directly to self-sacrifice. Together with the focus on choice within 
consent theory, the value attributed to suffering performs a hegemonic function. The 
criticisms regarding the differences in terms of the severity of “consequences” are 
discarded by constructing suffering as a choice with a positive outcome rather than a 
negative one. Detaching the negativity from suffering further contributes to the ways in 
which nonviolence disables the discussion of different contexts, subject positions and 
social conditions. So the idea of redemptive suffering not only reinforces 
decontextualization, but it also discards the critique of decontextualization beforehand. 
Because suffering is considered as desirable, rather than a problem, the criticisms 
deriving from the different experiences of suffering fall short. In other words, the 
problematization of differences in terms of the severities, as in “some suffer more” 
becomes irrelevant because suffering’s connotation is constructed as positive.  
Decontextualization and redemptive suffering are also crucial to the argument 
that nonviolence is open to everyone, is more democratic and accordingly morally 
superior. As opposed to violent forms of resistance, which require some form of 
expertise, weapons etc., nonviolence solely requires adherence to the moral code of 
nonviolence. The argument stated as such is compelling, but, it has limits that may go 
unnoticed. Even if nonviolence is more open to participation, not everyone is subjected 
to same risks. While participation may be available to all, survival is not. Sharp argues 
that subjects are ultimately capable of choosing whether to obey or to face the 
consequences of disobedience (1973:21-23). But the differences in terms of the 
consequences of disobedience challenge the idea that nonviolence is open to everyone. 
The moral superiority of nonviolence is also constructed through defining 
violence as the “tool of the enemy”. “Enemy” here is used to refer to the opponent, 
which may be a group, state, structure, conditions or power holders. Because 
nonviolence thought emphasizes “love for the other” as the guide for action, and urges 
to win the opponent, rather than winning over the opponent (King Jr, 1957), at first, the 
phrase “enemy” seems alien. However, what translates the opponent into enemy is its 
adherence to violence. The position of enemy is already defined in relation to violence, 
and the opponent falls into that category only after adhering to violence. The defining 
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quality of the enemy, in other words, is violence. The agents are not against the enemy 
per se, but rather are against violence making the translation of the opponent into enemy 
possible. 
Relatedly, use of violent means is construed as diminishing the differences 
between the moral agents and the enemy, and “blurring the us/them distinction” 
(Mueller, 2004:141). Since violence is an immoral tool adopted by the immoral enemy, 
rejection of it is a ground for the construction of a moral self. Rejection of violence in 
this sense is a manifestation of a categorical separation between the evil enemy and the 
moral us. Because violence is considered as a necessary rule of the enemy’s game, 
violent means inevitably lead to the reproduction of the system opposed. Adopting the 
tool of the enemy, in other words, is construed as playing the enemy's game, and 
thereby reproducing of the system that the agent is acting against. Refusing to adopt 
these tools not only manifest the differences between the agents and the enemy, but also 
mean depriving the opponent and the system/game of the conditions for its reproduction 
(Gandhi, 2001; King Jr, 1963). 
Because consent theory is based on individuals as initiators of change, the way 
in which the self is taken into consideration, the “moral self”, is a crucial point in 
nonviolence thought. The moral commitments of the agents are taken as signifiers of the 
justness of the cause. The emphasis on nonviolent action as the “last resort” when 
conventional, constitutional and lawful means have failed, for instance, is prevalently 
used as a way to suggest the rightfulness of the action (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; 
King Jr, 1957). The discursive link between the moral self and the legitimacy claim for 
the act rely on the idea is that the cause must have been just, or otherwise law-abiding 
citizens would not have violated the law. While the agents recognize the legitimacy of 
the order and the just laws, in other words, they are against the unjust ones. King Jr, for 
example, stated that people taking part in civil disobedience “are not anarchists6 […] 
they do not seek to defy the law, they do not seek to evade the law” (1991:49). The 
emphases on disobedience as being “civil, not criminal”, and that it is aimed at 
changing specific laws deemed unjust, rather than aiming to violate the law (Atack, 
2011: 82-83) presupposes the legitimacy of the order and its law. But it also establishes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 While it is appropriate to argue that anarchists do seek to defy the law of the 
state, here, King Jr refers to the discursively negative connotations of anarchists 
as initiators of violence, chaos and disorder. 
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a discursive distinction between “normally law-abiding citizens who are rightfully 
acting out to right a wrong” and the “criminals”. Such distinction fulfills two tasks; first, 
it criminalizes people who do not adopt nonviolence and leaves them in a position prone 
to police/state brutality (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a), and provides a relatively positive 
representation of nonviolence compared to the one of the criminalized depiction of 
alternative means. And second, it incorporates the discursive force of the morality 
claims regarding the order into the morality of nonviolence. The legitimate and moral 
qualities of nonviolence actions and nonviolent actors are knitted into the established 
narrative of the order’s legitimacy and morality. The morality attributed to the docility 
and respect for the order, in other words, is discursively transferred to nonviolent 
action.7  
The constitution of a “moral self” and the understanding of “redemptive 
suffering” allow generalization of a subjective condition to a broader body of political 
subjects for the judgment of the experience. In other words, the valorization of the 
suffering and the establishment of a “moral self” enable the grounds for the translation 
of a particular social reality - and the truth formed through it - to a universal one. The 
legitimacy and morality claims establish a hierarchical position that assumes the right to 
define and assert what is “right” and “good” and even what is “necessary” (Gelderloos, 
2007). But the assumed right to define “what is good, evil, right or wrong to do” works 
through a paternalistic hierarchy that assumes “a sublime arrogance in its implicit 
assumption that its adherents can somehow dictate the terms of the struggle” (Churchill, 
2007:47).  
Affirming the authoritarian potential in nonviolence, Pearlman theorizes “broad-
based participation, discipline and strategic coherence” as essentially necessary for the 
successful deployment of nonviolent means (2012:29, emphasis mine). The coherence 
conceptualized in this frame is not a consensual unity, but one that is shaped by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 At first sight, the distinctions between the “self” and the “enemy”, and the 
respect for the order seem contradicting especially because the enemy is broadly 
defined as including both persons, state, structures and power holders. But it is 
important to remember that nonviolence relies on the capacity of the enemy to 
turn into an ally, and that consent theory of power is built on individuals. Even 
when state is defined as the enemy, for example, what is referred is not the state 
as a structure. The idea is to introduce an impact on the people who happen to run 
the state. Therefore, when the actions are aimed at the state, they are not opposing 
the idea of the state, but rather are aimed at actual people deemed responsible for 
the injustices defined.  
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discipline. Coherence, in other words, is not an outcome of egalitarian relationships, but 
of the movement’s ability “to centralize authority and institutionalize command and 
control” (ibid.:42). The subjects, in this sense, inherit the moral superiority associated 
with nonviolence, and arm themselves with the authority to, not only dictate, but also 
enforce the forms of the struggle with the common practices of “citizen’s arrest”, where 
nonviolent protestors arrest the “criminals” and wait until the police officers come and 
do the official arrest, or “peace marshals” as participants appointed by the central 
authority to monitor the “troublemakers”  (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a: 63-6; Gelderloos, 
2007:41-7). 
 
 
 
2.3 Nonviolence works, violence does not/cannot 
(Dear Power, let’s talk this through) 
 
 
 
The effort to establish nonviolence as more than opposition to violence also 
represents itself within arguments regarding nonviolence’s efficacy. The arguments 
regarding nonviolence’s efficacy, as it was the case with morality claims, are a 
combination of arguments for nonviolence and against violence. The conventional 
separation of principled and instrumental tends to situate the matter of efficacy into the 
instrumental camp, however, here, the understanding of efficacy is not limited to 
practical contributions of nonviolence to the outcome of the act, but also includes the 
capacity of nonviolence to work. Going beyond the understanding of efficacy as pure 
instrumentality, here, the arguments located in principled approach, such as the intricate 
relationship between means and end, is also taken into hand as a matter of efficacy, that 
is, nonviolence’s capacity to work. The arguments explicating why nonviolence works 
include (1) violence does not have the capacity to work, (2) nonviolence has 
transformative power (political jiu-jitsu) and allows broader participation, and (3) 
violence leads to increased repression.  
The rejection of violence as a legitimate means towards an ideal end, apart from 
violence being always morally wrong, is also situated in arguments regarding the lack of 
capacity of violence for reaching the ideal ends. As violence, almost alchemically, is 
incapable of achieving desired outcomes, nonviolence possesses the necessary 
ingredients both in form and content. Within such understanding, besides its moral 
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inferiority, violence cannot work. The lack of capacity of violence to work relies on the 
understanding of the inseparability of means from ends. The idea is that means cannot 
be taken into consideration as separate entities from the ends pursued, and hence, ends 
should be reproduced in the means adopted (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; King Jr, 1963). 
Gandhi, for instance, argues that: 
   “If I want to deprive you of your watch, I shall certainly have to fight for 
it; if I want to buy your watch, I shall have to pay for it; and if I want a gift, 
I shall have to plead for it; and, according to the means I deploy, the watch 
is stolen property, my own property, or a donation. Thus we see three 
different results from three different means.” (2001:25).  
 
Because means define ends, violence cannot be thought of as an appropriate 
means for the achievement of the ideal end, which is not violent. Just as it is not 
possible to “get a rose through planting a noxious weed” (ibid.:22), one cannot achieve 
a nonviolent end through violent means. Since nonviolence thought embraces 
nonviolence not solely as a means but as an ideal in itself, the ends achieved via violent 
means would then jeopardize and contradict with the ideal. Accordingly, nonviolence 
thought not only opposes the idea that violent means could be justified for a nonviolent 
future, but also states that a nonviolent future cannot be achieved via violent means. 
Within such understanding, violence is both wrong and discordant/futile. 
Nonviolence, on the other hand, besides its moral superiority, also has a 
capacity to work. Besides the unity between the means and ends, by refusing to deploy 
violence, nonviolence deprives the opponent of the violence it requires as a way to 
secure her/his position. As violence, the tool of the enemy, is doomed to bring nothing 
but more violence, nonviolence is seen as a way to disrupt the chain of violence. The 
disruption is not limited to one’s own refraining from violence, but also occurs through 
the transformative power located in “redemptive suffering”. Particularly in the cases of 
severe repression, due to the observable power imbalance between the perpetrators and 
the recipient ends of violence, nonviolence “backfires” and the opponent’s violence 
works to nonviolent agents’ benefit. This process is called as “political jiu-jitsu”, where 
“the violence of the opponents may rebound to undermine their own position” (Sharp, 
1996:235). 
Political jiu-jitsu highly relies on “redemptive suffering”, because its functioning 
relies on the visibility of power imbalance between the opponent and the receiving end 
of violence. The functions of redemptive suffering (representing the sincerity and 
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working as a transformative force) are enhanced in relation to the severity of the 
opponent’s adherence to violence. The formation of a moral self sticking with the moral 
code despite the opponent’s violence is considered as a mechanism with a capacity to 
undermine the opponent’s power by the way of allowing loyalty shifts and broader 
participation. Loyalty shifts and broader participation include potential allies, otherwise 
indifferent parties, and “pillars of support” - the “organizations and institutions, […] 
which supply the necessary sources of power to the opponent group” (Sharp, 2005:35). 
The increasing severity of the suffering, it is argued, would bring about more support 
for the cause by challenging the legitimacy of the opponent, and invoking compassion 
in third parties and turning them into allies (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; Sharp, 1959 & 
1973 & 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). 
The idea of “backfiring” is that just as people would be inclined to intervene in 
the case of a strong person attacking a weak one not fighting back, the practice of 
redemptive suffering would similarly initiate broader participation and support (Gandhi, 
2001; Gregg, 1960:43-46). However, there are several possible scenarios that alter the 
articulation of the way in which political jiu-jitsu works. Consider A the strong one, B 
the weak, and C the third party. C may concur with A that B should be hit; C may not 
concur with A, but may benefit from B’s suffering; C may not concur with A, but may 
fear becoming a target and remain silent; C may concur with A, but still oppose the 
hitting and may or may not act about it. C’s actions ultimately rely on the relationships 
and relations of power between A, B and C. And more importantly, the complexity of 
the relations between social agents, groups, states etc. are far more complicated than the 
one in an example of 3 people. Even with an example of three individuals, the 
formulation of political jiu-jitsu does not work, making it even less convincing when 
translated into social relations of power. 
While invoking compassion in third parties may lead them to oppose the 
violence of the opponent, it is one thing to oppose violence, and yet quite another to 
actually support the cause behind the act. Political jiu-jitsu, particularly in the cases of 
loyalty shifts among “pillars of support” as “mechanisms of coercion and enforcement” 
such as police force and law officials (Atack, 2011:113), may in fact prove useful for 
the cause. However, this may both be about pillars of supports’ transition into allies, as 
well as their refusal to obey orders they deem unfair or disproportionate. In the first 
case, the loyalty shift would increase the mobilization potential and enhance the 
chances of success. Yet, it is not possible to tell with precision whether this shift is 
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about the cause or redemptive suffering. And in the second, even if it may not 
necessarily point to an increased participation, it would still increase the chances of 
success for it would limit the opponent’s capacity to coerce and enforce violently. But 
this limitation would only be relevant for the short them since as soon as the opponent’s 
violence disappears, the effect of political jiu-jitsu would be reversed and the 
opponent’s capacity would be restored. In either case, it is not possible to neatly locate 
the contribution of redemptive suffering to the outcome.  It does not sound quite 
convincing that support for the cause would emerge from redemptive suffering. While it 
makes sense to argue that the concept of political jiu-jitsu, when achieved, is 
advantageous for the movement, whether the advantage is limited to opposition to the 
opponent’s severe violence or includes a change of opinion and commitment to the 
cause remains unclear. 
For political jiu-jitsu concerning third parties, nonviolence thought ties the 
opposition to opponent’s violence and commitment to the cause together by extending 
the critique of violence to the delegitimization of the opponent. By observing the severe 
violence and oppression of the opponent, third parties would question the legitimacy of 
the opponent, and support the nonviolent group’s cause. However, while severe 
violence may have a potential to initiate delegitimization of the opponent, its direct 
translation into support for the cause is only possible if the cause is aimed at the 
opponent’s position. Just because people question the legitimacy of the opponent, in 
other words, does not necessarily mean that they would support causes in conflict with 
the opponent regardless of cause’s content. 
But even if the third parties would be sympathetic to the cause, such articulation 
is still prone to criticism because of its one-dimensional understanding of power as an 
individual matter. The presented scenario of the breakthrough of power relations 
between the subject and the ruler works only “when there is an obvious oppressor” 
(Martin, 1989:217) encompassing all forms and relations of power. But power is 
reproduced and maintained through various nodes (Foucault, 1972), and this mechanism 
incorporates the agents into the nets of power. Within the nets of power, in relation to 
the complexity of their constitution, relations of subjugation and benefit/privilege are 
diverse. Therefore, in the absence of an obvious oppressor with a singular form of 
oppression, consent theory falls short in providing a convincing picture. While the 
concept of “loci of power” attempts to cover this diversity, it ultimately fails to 
acknowledge the “possible supportive relationships between the loci (‘various social 
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groups’), and dominant social groups, and conflicts between the loci themselves” 
(Martin, 1989:218). Subject positions, in other words, are more complex than a one-
dimensional understanding of “rulers and subjects” and most, if not all, subject 
positions entail both ruling and subjection. Considering that power is productive and its 
operation includes benefits as well as repression (Foucault, 1978) weakens the idea of 
sympathy for the cause’s translation into active support.  
A comparative study of 323 cases of violent and nonviolent resistance 
campaigns from 1900 to 2006 by Stephan and Chenoweth, in fact, concludes, 
“nonviolent resistance methods have insignificant effects on security force defections” 
(2008:20-21). 8 The study also concludes that deployment of nonviolent methods is 
more likely to succeed (2008:42). Working on the criteria regarding use of violence, 
external support, and loyalty shifts, the study defines success as the achievement of the 
objective within a two-year period. The resistance campaigns are defined as “a series of 
observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective” (ibid.:16) and the data 
pool for the campaigns is defined as “conflicts between nonstate and state actors” 
(ibid.:8). However, the contents of the political objectives are not specified. To what 
extent the differences between the radicalness of the objectives account for the results is 
not taken into consideration. While “violent campaigns” are set to include wars, 
counterinsurgencies, and acts of armed combatant groups, such information about 
“nonviolent campaigns” is also missing. Even if the study provides important statistical 
analysis of how violent repression, internal and external support, and security force 
defections contribute to the achievements of the objectives within nonviolent and 
violent campaigns separately, the study’s ground for comparison is not solid. 
Besides political jiu-jitsu, nonviolence is also granted the capacity to increase 
mobilization potential by providing room for “people with lower risk-acceptance” 
(Mueller, 2004:141). This claim situates nonviolence as the safer choice, but the safety 
is limited to the absence of violence on the participants’ part since nonviolence cannot 
ensure that the opponent would not attempt to violently oppress the movement. The 
grounding of the claim relies on the arguments that deployment of violent means leads 
to increased oppression and that “unlike during violent resistance, the oppressor will not 
be able to easily justify his [sic] repression in the face of a nonviolent protest” (Samad, 
2008:21). The argument that nonviolence provides a safer environment, then, is two-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 For a detailed (and rather hostile) critique of Stephan & Chenoweth’s work, see 
Gelderloos, 2013:43-6. 
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folded. First, refraining from violent acts, nonviolence provides a safer environment. 
And second, this refraining is also constructed as  “reduc[ing] the pressure on the 
opponent to be defensively aggressive” (Sharma, 2008:91). Stated as such, the 
establishment of nonviolence as the safer choice resonates with the presupposed 
legitimacy of the order and the law, and the confirmation of the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate use of violence (Atack, 2011:89). The idea is about the state’s capacity to 
justify the use of violence, that is, to posit that particular use of violence into the room 
provided for the “legitimate use of violence”, implying the justifiability and affirmation 
of the state’s violence. Limiting the actions to the cases that would not “provoke” the 
state to act violent, within such understanding, is also constructed as the participants’ 
responsibility, which exempts the state from the nonviolent norm. The violence opposed 
remains limited to that of the participants, and the state’s violence, constructed as 
“inevitable, neutral and beyond reproach” (Gelderloos, 2007:39) is further normalized. 
However, it is important to say that I do not mean to argue against that 
nonviolence, when also conformed to by the state, provides a more convenient 
environment for people with lower-risk acceptance. Rather, I aim to scrutinize why and 
how that may be the case, and to clarify the premises on which such argument relies. 
While the claim that nonviolence provides a relatively safer environment is valid, it is 
also important to point out that state’s monopoly on violence is off target for 
nonviolence’s critique of violence. As there have been attempts to include state’s 
violence into the nonviolence thought (Atack, 2011: 88-99; Gregg, 1960-103-112) they 
do not resolve the tension of nonviolence thought’s dependence on the presupposition 
of the legitimacy of the order, law and the state.  How “disobedience as the last resort”, 
or the construction of the nonviolent agents as responsible for ensuring a nonviolent 
space relate to such critique are not resolved. The state, however violent, is still 
constructed as a communicable, moral and paternal entity that can be called into reason. 
The inclusion of the critique, then, is still more about working for the conditions in 
which state does not act violent than problematizing the conditions of the possibility of 
state’s violent actions. 
 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
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 The defense of nonviolence is articulated by arguments of efficacy and moral 
superiority. As efficacy claims posit nonviolence as better equipped with the tools 
capable of achieving desired outcomes, morality claims draw on the restrictions to the 
use of violence. Yet, the conceptualization of success for nonviolent actions is limited 
to the achievements within the system. Because nonviolence thought presupposes the 
legitimacy of the order, in addition to being incapable of achieving radical 
transformations, nonviolence is actually oriented towards ameliorating the conditions 
within the current order. This then means to being, not solely incapable of but unwilling 
to achieve transformatory outcomes. 
This is in line with the consent theory of power, where the focus is on 
individuals as the basis for theorization. Power in consent theory, and within 
nonviolence, is taken to be an individual matter where individuals are dividable into 
distinct categories of subjects and rulers. The problems, accordingly, could also be 
solved at the individual level, without necessarily initiating a challenge to the structures 
(or the system as a whole). The mechanisms associated with nonviolence accord with 
the individual focus, where politics is similarly reduced to different forms of 
“convincing”. Such an approach to power, however, is highly simplistic. It not only 
misses the availability of multiple positions disabling a neat ruler-subject distinction, 
but it also remains quite incapable of explaining the ways in which power operates. 
Decontextualization is another problem with nonviolence theorization, where 
nonviolence is asserted regardless of the different material, affective and social 
possibilities and limitations that different subject positions may entail. The dismissal of 
differences in terms of the risks and availability of forms of resistance from the picture 
as relevant criterion establishes a positional superiority. The generalization of subjective 
criteria deriving from subjective conditions to a broader body of political subjects 
embodying different subject positions limits the discussion of alternatives.  
The normative frame of nonviolence then takes a doxic/dogmatic form, where 
the commitment to nonviolence principles holds an authoritarian tone (Dupuis-Déri, 
2010:64). In dictating the norms of the struggle, nonviolence also has a potential to 
criminalize other means of struggle, and thereby rendering the social actors deploying 
other means vulnerable to the oppressor’s violence. This sometimes goes even further, 
where agents favoring nonviolent means materialize their positional superiority. The 
vulnerability initiated by the “good protestor – bad protestor” categories are performed 
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on “bad protestors” on behalf of the state through the practices of “peace marshals” or 
“citizen’s arrest” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a; Gelderloos, 2007). 
Finally, the place attributed to violence of the opponent deems nonviolence as 
highly dependent on the opponent. Due to the transformative capacity attributed to 
suffering deriving from the violence of the opponent, without the opponent and its 
violence, nonviolence looses its ground for the achievement of desired objectives. And 
because suffering is glorified, nonviolence risks producing an environment where 
victimhood, “being recognized as a victim can be[come] a valuable psychological 
commodity” (Noor et al., 2012:359). Invoking the discourses of martyrdom, the notion 
of “redemptive suffering” has a potential to create a habitus where suffering, 
victimhood and sacrifice are approbated. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
 
“The distinction that really matters is not between violence 
and non-violence, but between having and not having an 
appetite for power.” 
George Orwell, Lear, Tolstoy, and the Fool 
 
 
 
 
Compared to nonviolence, it is relatively harder to provide a coherent map of the 
arguments for the defense of violence. In nonviolence, nonviolence comes first. That is, 
the theory is articulated in relation to nonviolence, with the explicit purpose of situating 
nonviolence as the proper course of action. Violence, on the other hand, is mostly 
theorized in relation to grand narratives, such as Marxism, that have already been 
established. Violence, in other words, is not theorized on its own, rather, it is mostly 
theorized in relation to a particular strand of thought. As nonviolence is construed as a 
line of thought in itself situating nonviolence as the core of practice and thought, 
violence is mostly theorized in relation to different articulations of the ways for 
changing the society. 
My aim in this chapter, following the chapter on nonviolence, is not to provide a 
complete account of how violence is theorized within particular strands of thought, but 
to locate different forms of argumentations for the defense of violence. These lines 
include end-orientation, instrumentality, expediency, essential necessity and entitlement 
claims to the use of violence. But it is important to note that these lines, and the 
approaches shaped by them are not mutually exclusive as the categorization of this 
chapter may suggest. In most cases, they work to support each other. Fanon, for 
instance, drawing on contextual limitations, invokes instrumental necessity, as he also 
provides a defense of violence on essential necessity terms. In a similar vein, the 
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essential necessity approach includes instrumental defenses of violence, which, 
however, are not end-oriented. The chapter, in short, while acknowledging the difficulty 
of a neat categorization, is organized according to different clusters of argumentation. 
The first three sections of this chapter draw on the theorization of violence in 
revolutionary rhetoric, defenses articulated for revolutionary contexts and for 
revolutionary purposes. The first section, looks at arguments focusing on violence’s 
expediency that provide an instrumental and end-oriented defense of violence. Violence 
is either justified through its expediency, or is excused due to contextual limitations 
rendering violence inevitable for the achievement of the end. The second section, 
essential necessity, is still end-oriented and relates to expediency, but establishes the 
defense of violence on non-instrumental terms. Violence’s necessity is constructed on 
the grounds of its pedagogic contribution to the formation and the emergence of the 
revolutionary subjectivity. In the third section, violence as response, the defense of 
violence is articulated by the claims of entitlement to violence. Widening the definition 
of violence to include capitalism, colonialism, exploitation and oppression allows the 
actions taken to their dismissal to be constituted as rightful reactions, invoking the logic 
of self-defense. The final section briefly outlines the current debates on violent means 
within the confrontational militant praxis. 
 
 
 
3.1 Violence as instrumentally necessary 
(Waiting for the revolution: the country for old men) 
 
 
 
The foremost argument for violence, as it was the case with nonviolence, is that 
violence works. But because violence is acknowledged as evil, its use requires 
explanations further than its efficacy. Instrumental necessity arguments work to buttress 
the efficacy claims through the end-oriented defense of violence, which includes 
justificatory and excusatory approaches (Finlay, 2006; Frazer & Hutchings, 2007 & 
2008; Hewlett, 2012). The justification approach adheres to “ends justify means” 
principle, and the excuse approach focuses on the permissibilty for the use of violence 
on the claims of necessity and the limitations forced by the context. Even if both 
approaches conclude that violence is effective and necessary, the ways in which they 
construct their defense is different. Both, however, have a specific notion of an end 
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towards which present actions are oriented. With the constitution of a determinately 
defined end, as “a future moment what is forever drifting towards infinity” (Springer, 
2014:407), politics become  
  
“paradoxically the end the political, or the end of the political as a creative 
act. The creation has already taken place: we already have the image of the 
world where we want to be, whether we call it ‘communism’, ‘anarchy’, or 
‘capitalism’. Creativity exists only for the means not for the end. […] 
Transitional politics is a utilitarian politics, both in the sense of offering a 
deferral of moral and ethical justification in the name of the outcome (‘you 
have to break eggs to make an omelette’; ‘we must sacrifice a generation to 
build communism’) and in reducing the politics in the present to 
‘administration’ pending the development of the new world where a ‘new 
politics’ become possible.” (Tormey, 2005:399-400). 
 
For the justification approach, means, as already defined as distinct from ends, 
are taken as justified to the extent of their efficiency towards achieving the end. Its 
application in revolutionary theorization with regard to violence refers to “overcoming 
of the traditional ethical constrains” (Mantena, 2012:2) rather than initiating a new 
ethical reading of violence. Violence is still taken as an evil, but because it works to 
secure a just end, its use in revolutionary context is not subjected to the usual reading. 
Violence, in other words, remains a dubious instrument, but the conventional 
moral/ethical judgment associated with its use is suspended temporarily for the course 
of its deployment. The promised future, especially compared to the present, obviates the 
means’ subjection to moral/ethical scrutiny, since violence -as evil- is deployed for a 
better future. What is at stake is to present an image of a just future, which then will be 
the ground upon which means will be justified. 
While what constitutes a just end may differ,9 within (orthodox) Marxism, 
“which expresses the historical interests of the proletariat, the end is justified if it leads 
to increasing the power of man over nature and to the abolition of the power of man 
over man [sic]” (Trotsky, 1973:25). The use of violence, then, is justified to the extent 
that it is able to “bring a new and better or at least a putatively better order” (Nielson, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 “The historical interests of the proletariat” is highly limited for a “just” end”, 
and is incompatible with the framework I adopt throughout the thesis. But since 
my aim here is to dwell on the ways in which violence’s defense is constructed, I 
abstain from the discussion of whose account counts for the establishment of what 
constitutes “just”. For the feminist interferences to such conceptualization, see 
Sargent, (1981); MacKinnon (1982); James (2012). 
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1981:214). However, Trotsky warns us, this does not necessarily mean that all means 
are permissible. What is of importance is “not the question of subjective motives but 
that of objective expediency” (1973:24). So not only the end has to be just, but also the 
means’ capacity to achieve it has to be secured. In order for the justification approach to 
work, then, first, the justness of the end has to be established, and second, the particular 
acts’ efficacy has to be accounted for. 
In the case of violence, the first is established by constructing the use of 
violence for the elimination of violence, which constitutes the better future. The 
revolution, in initiating a classless society free of exploitation, is taken to constitute a 
just end. Exploitation here is defined as violent, and the use of violence aimed at its 
removal endorses the better and just future to come about. Compared to the current 
violence of the order, the proposed end’s superiority supports the justification claims. 
This allows the exclusion of means, as the future and the present are established as the 
leading criteria for the judgment. The second, on the other hand, is rather complex for 
“objective expediency” is hard to evaluate beforehand. Because of the “sheer 
unpredictability of action” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:181), the means’ “justification 
loses plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future” (Arendt, 1970:52).  
Leaving the problems initiated by the difficulty of assessing the objective 
expediency and the unpredictability factor aside for a moment, even if the end would be 
foreseeable and objective expediency would be assessed and affirmed, the justification 
approach still poses problems for lacking a limiting criterion regarding the use of 
violence. Even if the end was foreseeable, because the justification of the end relies on 
efficacy, just-ends approach risks justifying “whatever violent methods are required to 
achieve it [end] without setting any natural limit” (Finlay, 2006:8). Because the 
comparison is between the present and the promised future, the means deployed for the 
transition is subjected to no criterion other than efficacy that would impose limitations 
to its use.10 
While his intention was not primarily to provide a solution to the limitation 
problem of the revolutionary use of violence, Buchanan’s application of Just War !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 From a position that takes the environmental cause a just one, and granting that 
the humans are responsible for environmental destruction, and several measures to 
stop them from doing so have failed, the argumentation would then follow that it 
is perfectly just to build a nuclear bomb for a genocide that would eliminate the 
human race off the earth. 
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Theory to the ethics of revolution (2013)11 provides insights regarding the problems of 
justification through efficacy. Building on the criteria of (1) Just Cause, (2) Reasonable 
Likelihood of Success, (3) Proportionality, and (4) Discrimination, he argues that the 
revolutionary forces would face difficulties in satisfying all criteria simultaneously. 
This is particularly important for the Just Cause and Likelihood of Success, for the 
severity of the oppression is directly proportionate to the Just Cause, as it is inversely 
proportionate to the Likelihood of Success. As the opponent’s violence increases, the 
legitimacy of initiation of a revolution for the overthrowal of the opponent increases 
with it. However, as the severity of the opponent’s violence increases, the likelihood of 
revolutionary success dramatically decreases. Thereon, Buchanan argues, the morally 
prima facie wrong actions may be justified granted they aim to solve collective action 
problems. In relation to the severity of opponent’s violence, otherwise wrong actions 
may be rendered justified for “compensating for interior military capacity” (ibid.:297-8) 
or ensuring broader participation (ibid.:290-303). Coercing the “fellow victims of 
oppression to solve the collective action problem of widespread participation” 
(ibid.323) or “manipulation of popular sentiment by provoking harsh measure by the 
regime” (ibid.:313, emphasis mine), for instance, may be morally justified for they are 
objectively expedient. Keeping in mind that Trotsky’s approach did not explicitly (or 
implicitly) refer to these principles that would set limitation to use of violence12, the 
end- and efficacy-oriented approach still relies on a slippery ground even when 
limitations are introduced. The articulation that morally problematic actions “must be 
performed if the revolution is to have significant chance of succeeding” (Buchanan, 
2013:294, emphasis original) renders any criteria other than efficacy or expediency 
irrelevant. Even with the limitations, justification through “objective expediency” 
remains highly susceptible to providing an open cheque for the use of violence.  
Going back to the problem of unpredictability, the risks mentioned above 
become even more important when one considers that the actions taken in the name of 
the end may not necessarily lead to the end proposed. The end-oriented justification 
combined with the difficulty of precisely predicting the ends initiates a paradox: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 In the rest of the article, Buchanan argues that the justification criteria should be 
separated for the initiation and continuation phases and that even when the 
initiation of the revolution may not be justified, participation may in fact be just.  
 
12 While Trotsky inhibits “individual terror”, his does so on the grounds that it 
fails to satisfy the expediency criteria (1973:24).  
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“justifying violence in terms of the ends to which it is a means, but at the same time 
acknowledging that the consequences of violence are not, after all, foreseeable” (Frazer 
& Hutchings, 2007:183). This difficulty poses a challenge for the satisfaction of the 
second criterion of “objective expediency”. If the means is justified to the extent of its 
“objective expediency”, but if this objective expediency is not easy to set forth neatly 
beforehand, the argument loses its plausibility. 
An alternative defense of violence, excusatory approach, bypassing the 
unpredictability problem, invokes violence’s instrumental necessity on empirical 
grounds (Beauvoir, 1948; Fanon, 1961; Engels, 1962; Hewlett, 2012). The excusatory 
and justificatory approaches concur that, first, the proposed end is superior to the 
current order and, second, that violence will work. The difference is that, here, necessity 
of violence is not established in terms of its expediency, that is, its leading to the just 
end. Rather, its convincing quality lies in its inevitability, which is a different force. 
Because the focus is on necessity and contextual inevitability, rather than on efficacy or 
expediency, the argument is not that “violence works”, but is that “violence is 
inevitably necessary”. The inevitability is related to the “context of the structural and 
systemic violence of the modern, capitalist and colonial state” (Frazer & Hutchings, 
2007:186). Accordingly, violence, within this approach, is not taken as a justified means 
to secure the proposed end, rather, here, violence is considered as a necessary evil 
compelled by the circumstances, and thereby is excused (Finlay, 2007; Frazer & 
Hutchings 2007 & 2008; Hewlett, 2012). In opposition to the violence of the opponent, 
along with its willingness to deploy it for the social conditions of the possibility of its 
endurance, adhering to violent means becomes inevitable for the achievement of the 
end. And through the inevitability, violence, while not being justified per se, is excused. 
As excuse refers to  “admission of fault”, whereas justification refers to “denial 
of fault and […] assertion of innocence” on part of the act (Walzer, 1973:170, quoted in 
Finlay, 2006:5), at first glance, excuse sounds less compelling compared to justification. 
However, excuse approach in fact reinforces the argument by disabling criticism. Since 
excuse already assumes the wrongdoing, the discursive function of excuse renders the 
critique of “violence as evil” irrelevant. And because the excuse approach does not 
necessarily pinpoint a particular point in time or refer to a particular action, whereas it 
was easier to question justification approach’s claims regarding expediency, it remains 
quite a hard job to refute excuse approach’s claim that violence at some point will be 
necessary. It is exactly this ambiguousness that makes the argument stronger against 
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criticism, which also renders it quite a dangerous one to adopt. The argumentation in its 
future orientation, but also in not providing clear criteria about the timing and 
contextual necessity of violence “makes it easier to overlook the actual, immediate 
consequences” of violence (Hollander, 2013:519). 
Apart from the conceptualization of violence as necessary, common in both 
approaches is the assumption that violence is, and can remain, instrumental. In the 
justification approach, violence is abstracted as an instrumental and separate means that 
has no bearing on the end. Instrumentality is an attempt to secure the ends from being 
tainted by the evil means. Excusatory approach, on the other hand, with regard to 
contextual necessity, while expressing hesitations about a neat distinction between 
means and ends, still provides a defense of instrumental use of violence. While at times 
the instrumentality is taken into hand as a categorical separation of means and ends 
(Trotsky, 1973); most proponents of violence’s instrumental necessity are critical of 
such sharp distinction since  “one can no more judge the means without the end which 
gives it its meaning than he [sic] can detach the ends from the means which defines it” 
(Beauvoir, 1948:65). But, this awareness on part of the intricate relationship between 
means and ends does not necessarily translate into a critical reading of the 
instrumentality of violence. Particularly evident in the excuse approach is to “invoke 
supplementary arguments to justify the ineradicability of violence from politics” (Frazer 
& Hutchings, 2007:185).13 Subordinating means to ends, or rendering the constitutive 
relationship between them secondary by promoting the instrumental use of violence on 
the grounds of necessity, however, particularly in the case of violence, undermines the 
productive aspect of violence. While the categorical separation of means and ends is in 
itself not quite possible, it is also hardly ever the case that violence remains as an 
instrumental tool that does not alter or challenge the ends as well as the subjects 
deploying violent means. 
Along with the correlative relationship between means and ends that disallow an 
abstracted instrumental use of violence for the destruction of the chosen order (Arendt, 
1970; Hewlett, 2012; Hollander, 2013), violence also has a productive function. It 
produces new subjects, subjectivities and relations. And this productive function brings !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 These arguments include approaches that construct links between violence and 
politics at both conceptual and empirical grounds (See Frazer & Hutchings 2007 
& 2008 & 2009). But since a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
violence and politics is beyond the scope of this thesis, here, I only refer to 
empirically situated argumentations. 
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the risk of challenging the end, for the differences it initiates may either be incompatible 
with the end, or they may devalue the justness of the end. Through the use of violence, 
in other words, not only the end is prone to deterioration, but also are the subjects 
deploying them. Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, as one of the foremost studies that 
promote instrumental use of violence, also provides significant insights regarding the 
socially and psychologically destructive long-term effects of violence on both the 
perpetrators and victims  (1961:181-234). Peteet shows the ways in which men taking 
part in Palestinian Intifada, after returning home, adopt a masculine identity that 
assumes a hierarchically superior position. Relying on an economy of sacrifice, men 
who return home having been perpetrators and victims of violence, “acquire masculine 
and revolutionary credentials” (1994:40). This position is then translated into domestic 
violence and attempts of increased control over women’s mobility (1994). Darici’s 
work on Kurdish youth in Adana, Turkey presents how “the long years of armed 
conflict have transformed Kurdishness into a new political subjectivity” (2011: 476). 
This new political identity does not only manifest itself in the guerilla forces, but it is 
also evident in the young Kurdish men who are not part of the guerilla forces in the 
conventional sense. Young men, according to Darici, mimic this emerging political 
subjectivity in forms available to them, which renders violence as a defining feature of 
the identification process. And similar to the cases referred above, acts of violence 
against family members are common as an extension of this process (ibid.:472). 
Nicholson, drawing from his experience, also talks about the ways in which violence 
becomes part of the identification (1999). Referring to spontaneous fights at the street, 
the school or church he has witnessed or has taken part in, he talks about the ways in 
which violence becomes part of the social life. The black youth, he tells, had “little 
except their bodies to celebrate life, [and] violence became part of that celebration” 
(1999:174, emphasis mine14). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 I refer to Nicholson because his narrative is exemplary of the ways in which 
violence is socialized into daily life.  However, valid for the other cases referred 
as well, it is also important to recognize the social conditions of the possibility of 
resistant violence. That is, it is important to take the structural limitations that 
deprive people from means to celebrate life, or the conditions that enable the 
emergence of violence possible into account. My aim is to underline the ways in 
which violence has a potential to be engrained into the socialization process and 
to become a communicative force. But in doing that, it is of utmost necessity to 
stress the structural components making this outcome possible. In other words, I 
do not mean to contribute to the position that asserts the dismissal of resistant 
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Violence, it seems, cannot remain a mere instrumental means to an end; rather, it 
becomes a communicative force. It becomes constitutive part of the identification 
process, not only through which identity is constructed, but also relationships are 
formed. Its use does not remain instrumental as opposed to the implication of 
instrumentality formation, which constructs the use of violence as similar to picking up 
and then dropping a tool. Violence as a means, however, is hardly capable of remaining 
instrumental, more often that not, subjects remain “trapped in the violence they have 
inflicted and suffered” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2008:98). The use of violence for 
achieving a defined end risks becoming a habitual form, that is, it becomes a learned 
form of action. Violence, in other words, does not remain as a tool exclusively used for 
a particular end, but its use has a potential to be generalized to a form that becomes 
constitutively part of both the subjects and the outcome realized. Even subjects who do 
not themselves inflict violence, embody it by the extension of the identification process 
that they are part of. In order for the instrumental necessity of violence to be defended, 
then, the establishment of justness of the end, and the contextual necessity are not 
enough. 
The defense of violence through the comparison of current order’s violence to 
the superior future to come about, in short, does not suffice. Because the means adopted 
cannot be abstracted as pure instruments devoid of effects on the subjects or on the 
ends, assuming that such comparison is possible, the productive effects of violence has 
to be introduced to the comparison ground. In other words, a comparison between 
future and present is not enough for validating the use of violence, since, violence, as a 
means is a dynamic force rather than a static means of transformation. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
violence on the grounds of its potential risks. What I intend to do is to refer to 
risks associated with the use of violence, without necessarily either rejecting its 
use, or rendering the social conditions of the possibility of violence invisible.  The 
critical remarks on violence here, in short, do not aim to be translated directly into 
a call for nonviolence, but rather is to point the weaknesses of and the potential 
risks associated with the use of violence within instrumental arguments. While it 
would not be accurate to assert that violence could never be instrumental, it is still 
hard to make a case for the instrumentality of violence that remains purely 
instrumental. 
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3.2 Violence as essentially necessary 
(The story of how the fist meant for the boss ended up in women’s head) 
 
 
 
The second articulation of necessity takes violence as an essentially required 
part of the revolutionary process. The necessity evoked here differs from the 
instrumental necessity, where the necessity stems from the contextual limitations, or 
violence is constituted as an efficient means towards the end. While the end is still 
relevant, in this approach, violence’s necessity is not instrumentally or exteriorly 
articulated. Rather, the necessity of violence stems from its intricate relationship to the 
revolutionary process. The transformative effects of violence, which constituted a 
vulnerability to the instrumentality account, are taken as positively contributive to the 
defined end. Violence, either through its educative, pedagogic function (Finlay, 
2006:17), which refers to the crystallization of the antagonistic interests of the 
oppressor and the oppressed, or from its reference to the emergence of a new 
subjectivity is constructed as essentially necessary for the achievement of the end 
(Fanon, 1961; Finlay, 2006; Sorel, 2004; Žižek, 2006 & 2008). Violence, taken as such, 
still has an expedient value, in that it works for the achievement of the end. But the 
expediency is not constructed in terms of an exterior instrument; rather, violence is a 
constitutive and an essential part of the revolutionary process. The handling of violence 
as such, differing from the former account of instrumental necessity, construes the 
necessity not as an inevitable and sad choice, but as an essential and appreciated one. 
As instrumental necessity proposed the temporary suspension of ethical constrains for 
the judgment of violence, here, the conventional ethical norms’ applicability to 
revolutionary violence are denied altogether. 
 The pedagogic function of violence is primarily related to its contribution to the 
revolutionary subjectivity. Revolutionary subjectivity entails the desire for the 
revolution, as well as the awareness of the antagonistic relationship between the 
oppressed and the oppressor. Violence deployed by the oppressed, in also invoking 
violence of the oppressor, assumes the role of a condensing lens that allows the ultimate 
realization of the antagonism. The peaceful state of order sustained by compromises on 
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behalf of the oppressor, reforms, enable the endurance of the power imbalance by 
making the current state friendlier, which works to soothe the anger of the oppressed 
(Fanon, 1961:89-93, 183; Sorel, 2004:74-82, 105-6, 182-4). In the course of severe 
violence, however, “the risk of being disarmed through concession” (Fanon, 1961:90), 
or the risk of being “satisfied inside the bourgeois world” (Sorel, 2004:123) is 
undermined. Not only is violence a necessary part of the revolution in enabling the real 
nature of the relationship between oppressor and the oppressed to be realized, but also 
the lack of violence is equally disruptive for the revolutionary process since “social 
peace” eradicates the “violent impulse to rebel” (Finlay, 2006:25). The constitutive 
necessity of violence, then, lies in its contribution to the perfection of the “cleavage” 
between the oppressed and the oppressor (Sorel, 2004:182). The engagement in 
violence on both parts, the oppressor and the oppressor, contribute to the conditions that 
make revolution possible. Only through the violent encounters would the rupture 
between the oppressed and oppressor be complete. Such articulation situates violence, 
regardless of by whom they are deployed, as a precondition for the revolutionary 
consciousness to emerge. Violence is not defended on the grounds that it would bring 
the revolution, but that it enhances, if not produces, the revolutionary subject and the 
will to the revolution. 
Violence working “to decipher social reality” (Fanon, 1961:96), or to “unmask 
the forces behind” (ibid.:40), still has an instrumental tone. But this instrumentality is 
not end-oriented. That is, violence is not an abstracted tool whose deployment would 
bring about the end. Rather, violence is an essential component for the achievement of 
the end. Violence, in its contribution to the revolutionary subjectivity, allows the 
conditions of the possibility of revolution. End of violence is not revolution; end of 
violence is more violence (Finlay, 2006:18).   
 But violence’s essential necessity is not limited to its contribution to the 
formation of a revolutionary subjectivity. Violence is also set to signify the embodiment 
of the revolutionary subjectivity. Since it is quite unlikely to “go directly from capitalist 
to revolutionary subjectivity” (Žižek, 2002:252, emphasis original), realization alone, 
cannot enable the transformation to the revolutionary subjectivity.  The violence of the 
oppressor is not limited to physical violence, but is also embedded in the psyche of the 
oppressed. The positions of the oppressed and the oppressor, that is to say, are not 
shaped seldom with brute force. Rather, they also include the definitions of the 
relationship between them. On part of the oppressed, as explained above, the true nature 
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of this relationship has to be realized. Violence, apart from the role it plays in this 
realization, also has a therapeutic function; it has a ritualistic value in enabling a rite of 
passage. Revolutionary violence, in this sense, is not  “a present hardship to be 
overcome” (Žižek, 2002:260); but itself is “an authentic act of liberation” (ibid.:261). 
Violence is the “cleansing force” (Fanon, 1961:51), through which the oppressed 
assumes a new subjectivity. Violence is “a liberating end in itself” (Žižek, 2006:380). 
 Because violence is taken as the mark of the emergence of a new subjectivity, an 
outside criterion for its evaluation does not exist; violence becomes “self-validating” 
(Finlay, 2006:14). Since violence in itself is liberating, and its mere existence is the 
embodiment of the revolutionary subjectivity, in other words, violence becomes “its 
own ontological proof” for validation (Žižek, 2002: 260). The current order, along with 
its ethics, is rendered incapable of judging actions.  Violence is considered as “part of 
the superstructure that will soon disappear anyway, [and will] be overtaken in an 
entirely new reality” (Hewlett, 2012:887). This, then, means violence “creates its own 
values, actions and limitations” (Finlay, 2006:27), to which no exterior criterion is 
applicable. Whether violence actually fulfills the task it promises becomes an 
irrelevant/impossible question, since the possibility of an objective criterion for the 
judgment is denied beforehand. It becomes similarly impossible to differentiate actions 
that serve freedom from the ones that perpetuate oppression.  
The constitution of the necessity of violence as such constructs the inevitability 
in a way that the decision to use violence is ultimately to choose between the current 
order and the desired future end. Such articulation establishes a discursive relationship 
between radicalness15 – an act’s capacity to bring about change- and violence. Because 
revolution cannot be imagined without violence, and is self-validated, violence and 
radicalness become interchangeably equivalent.  A violent act that lacks factual capacity 
to bring about change may then risks being deemed revolutionary and radical for the 
mere fact that it is violent. Because violence is validated in advance, the essentially 
necessity approach does not allow for the scrutinization of the use of violence. Similar 
to the excusatory approach, where the vaguely defined necessity did not provide any 
limitations to the use of violence, the essentially constituted necessity too poses a great 
risk for providing “a blank cheque for the commission of violence” (Finlay, 2006:29).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Such discursive equivalence applies to necessity and end-oriented arguments in 
general.  
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But even if violence would indeed have a pedagogic and therapeutic function for 
the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor, the complexity of the ways in 
which the positions of oppressed and the oppressor are formed poses a threat to the 
integrity of the essential necessity approach. As Sorel and Žižek focus on class 
relations, Fanon draws on the colonial context. However, the positions of the oppressed 
and the oppressor are not limited to the definitions deriving from class or colonial 
relations. Considering the different axis of power intersecting for the constitution of 
subject positions, such as ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, the positions of the 
“oppressed” and the “oppressor” are not easy to define. The “violence of the oppressed 
towards the oppressor is liberating” argument, then, invites the question of which line of 
oppression to render as primary ground for liberation. The argument ultimately relies on 
a hierarchical order of the structures that contribute to the formations of the positions of 
the oppressed and the oppressor. The social constitution of subject positions, in other 
words, in being unable to offer neat categories of the “oppressed” and the “oppressor”, 
translates the liberation argument to a state in which almost everyone is licensed to 
inflict violence against everyone else. Since this is not a plausible position to defend, 
the tendency is usually to initiate a hierarchical order, where some forms of oppressions 
are privileged over others through “an official pluralism which ultimately denies the 
hierarchies associated with difference” (Vogel, 1991, quoted in Mann & Huffman, 
2005:64). The outcome of such ranking between different sources of problems, mostly 
end up in cases where the lines of oppression that relate to LGBTIQ, women, children, 
animals, disabled and the environment always remain secondary.  
 
 
 
3.3 Violence as response 
(Rhetoric made me do it) 
 
 
 
The approach that defends violence as response, while concurring with the 
instrumental necessity approach on violence as evil that requires explanation, adopts a 
different route. By widening the definition of what constitutes violence, adopted violent 
means are constructed as rightful responses to opponent’s violence. Invoking the notion 
of self-defense, the formulation is that the oppressed hold the right to act violent against 
their oppressors. Such defense of violence is not built on the good that will come 
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through its use, but rather is built in terms of a right to use it. The justification ground, 
in other words, is not about the end to which violence is a means; here, violence is a 
rightful response/reaction that the subjects claim entitlement to. 
The primary ground for this articulation involves widening the definition of 
what constitutes violence. The definition of violence is set to include depriving people 
of their capacity to choose and limiting their autonomy (Garver, [1973] 2009:170-182); 
omission, failing to avoid harm that could have been prevented (Harris, [1974] 
2009:185-206); and conditions that do not directly inflict harm to people but indirectly 
leads to harm (Engels, 1958). Inclusion of oppression, injustice and exploitation render 
the current conditions as violence and thereby allow the constitution of violent actions 
as a defensive response. 
 The instrumental and essential necessity defenses of violence use future as the 
reference point for evaluating the current use of violent means. The use of violence, 
within these approaches, is end-oriented. By comparing the current conditions to the 
superior future, the good to come about is taken as overwhelming the harm caused. 
Violence as response articulation, on the other hand, focuses on the present. Compared 
to the violent state of the present, the actions taken against them remain “a drop in the 
ocean” (Goldman, 2011:9). Keeping the focus on the current conditions, and construing 
the current state as violent is used as the grounds for rendering violent actions as self-
defense. Defining current conditions as violence, unlike the justificatory and excusatory 
approaches, in other words, the response approach does not aim to compare them to the 
proposed better future. What it accomplishes is to transfer the legitimacy of self-defense 
to the revolutionary and resistant uses of violence, which relieves the argument of the 
unpredictability burden. Because self-defense presupposes the right to act in one’s 
defense, here, the convincing force is built on that right to violence, rather than what 
violence may accomplish. Whereas the end-oriented approaches necessitate a certain 
amount of clarifying the means’ relations to ends, within self-defense, the focus is on 
the act itself. However, this does not necessarily refer to exclusion of future altogether 
on part of the response approach. While what the response may accomplish in the future 
is not taken into consideration, the possibility of further attacks from the opponents is 
included. 
The commonsensical understanding of self-defense implies an instant, almost 
reactive response to an observable opponent; yet, the definition of violence adopted 
here does not presuppose an action or a subject. Violence being reacted to, in this sense, 
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is more of something that occurs rather than an action partaken by an observable agent. 
Exploitation, for example, is “as violent as if they [workers] have been stabbed or shot” 
(Engels, 1958:108). Exploitation as violence, then, provides the grounds for a rightful 
violent response as self-defense. But exploitation as violence does not have an agent 
acting deliberately violent in the conventional sense of the term self-defense implies. 
The notion of self-defense, then, is expanded to be compatible with the adopted 
conceptualization of violence. 
The legitimacy/justification ground of self-defense, as suggested by the naming, 
heavily relies on one’s right to defend oneself against an opponent aiming or inflicting 
harm. But because violence defined here lacks both the opponent and an observable 
action, “how to defend oneself from violence” becomes a difficult question. In the case 
of exploitation, for example, capitalism is defined as responsible for violence. But, 
granted the right to react violently to its violence, how does one exactly act violent 
against capitalism? Due to the ambiguity of acting violent against capitalism, the notion 
of self-defense necessitates a modification. Since the existence and endurance of 
capitalism ensures exploitation, acts taken against the social conditions of the possibility 
of capitalism are included into the definition of self-defense. The re-definition of what 
constitutes self-defense, then, incorporates future into the present. But, as mentioned 
above, the future’s relevance to justification ground is not about its superiority to the 
current conditions as it was the case with excusatory and justificatory approaches. It is 
not the elimination of capitalism that responsive approach promotes; the focus is on the 
right to respond to capitalism violently. As the end-oriented necessity approaches argue 
that “in order to get rid of capitalism, we have to use violent means”, the response 
approach argues that “capitalism is and will be violent, and we have a right to act 
violent in return”. The inclusion of the future, in other words, fulfills the purpose of 
securing the right to act violent. 
Due to the difficulty of elaborating what violence against capitalism or 
exploitation may entail, the response approach risks “personalizing rather anonymous 
institutions and structures” (Iser, 2014:15). While it is possible to designate a group of 
exploiters as responsible for the exploitation, it is not quite possible to neatly point to 
particular persons as the recipient end of rightful defensive violence. Even when 
violence has actual agents, such as state’s military forces killing in the name of the 
state, it is still not possible to attribute all the responsibility to the soldiers. State, as a 
structure, indeed produces and, in fact, in its very existence, embodies, violence. Yet, 
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the violence of the state is neither reducible to the agents executing violence on its 
behalf, nor would state –or its violence- wither away by the elimination of members of 
the military forces of the state.  
Another relevant problem is evident in terms of the right to violence defined that 
blurs the lines between retaliation and self-defense. As self-defense gets its ground from 
the right to defend oneself, retaliation does not consider defense as a relevant criteria. 
The mere fact that harm has been done in itself provides the right to act back. Similarly, 
self-defense has a specific time frame for its ultimate aim is to avoid harm. Retaliation, 
on the other hand, does not have any limitations as such. But these differences here do 
not fit, for the conceptualization of violence adopted here is something that occurs, 
rather than an action that has a beginning and an end. The difficulty of assessing to what 
extent particular acts of violence perform defensive or retaliatory tasks remains a 
problem within response approach (Gordon, 2008:104-8; Iser, 2014). While it is 
possible to argue that retaliation is also a legitimate ground for the justification of 
violence, the articulation of response approach does not conceptualize it as such. As it 
makes sense to use self-defense over retaliation, for the former has a relatively better 
connotation, it is still necessary to clarify the potential differences. 
A particularly powerful aspect of the response approach lies in its capacity to 
construct one’s use of violence as dependent on the opponents’. Depicting the severity 
of the opponent’s violence in the forms of either “they do it all the time” or “they did it 
first” marks the subjects’ actions as response, making them dependent on the 
opponent’s actions. Construing one’s actions as reactions transfers the responsibility to 
the opponent party since without the initial action there can be no reaction: 
“I’m nonviolent with those who are nonviolent with me. But when you drop that 
violence on me, then you’ve made me go insane, and I’m not responsible for what I do.” 
(Malcolm X, 1999:170). 
 Even if self-defense in itself does not alter the negative meaning of violence, 
the subject becomes entitled to act violently without being contaminated by violence’s 
negativity. While this is a viable articulation that provides a legitimate subject position 
free of the responsibility for the harms brought about violence, due to the broad 
definition of violence, almost everyone is licensed to act violent against everyone else. 
Since this is not really a viable position to defend, the problem of the hierarchical order 
of grievances then again introduces itself. 
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3.4 Current debates on violence 
(Rock-ing the way to the revolution) 
 
 
 
As the approaches outlined above refer to revolutionary contexts and the 
organized mass armed insurrection aiming to “overthrow an existing regime and replace 
it with a new one” (Buchanan, 2013:291), the current discussion of violent means 
mostly refer to “use of non-lethal violence during protests: scenes of property 
destruction and confrontations with police on the streets” (Gordon, 2008:80). 
While the confrontations with the police lack the overthrowal capacity organized 
mass armed insurrections have, they in no way fall short of producing 
“Valdsromantiker”s, subjects “captured by the romanticism of the of violent struggle, 
[…] and the existential positioning of physical confrontation” (Mueller, 2004:135), i.e. 
subjectivities glorifying violence. These subjectivities, in turn, produce “riot porn” 
(Razsa, 2013) or “ritualized confrontation” (Sullivan, 2005a), where violence becomes 
a vital part of what constitutes resistance. 
Related to the discursive association of violence and radicalness, violence risks 
taking on a fetishized, hegemonic and dogmatic form (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a; Gelderloos, 
2007 & 2013; Juris, 2005; Mueller, 2004; Nappalos, 2013; Sullivan 2005a; Razsa, 
2013). Such discursive association produces a normative frame that establishes the 
limits of viable and preferred means beforehand. The valorization and radicalization of 
violence evaporate the questions of what the violent confrontations enable and disable. 
The distinction between opposing nonviolence as the prohibition of violence, and 
opposing nonviolence as lack of violence similarly vanishes. While it is one thing to 
oppose the prohibition of violence altogether, it is quite another to oppose the idea of 
nonviolence as deployment of means that are not violent. Yet, the dogmatic form 
violence takes operates in a frame where violence and nonviolence are constructed as 
binaries: it is either violence or nonviolence. Such binary produces an absolutism and 
disables a “functioning diversity of tactics” (Gelderloos, 2013:237, emphasis mine), 
where everyone ideally has the room to choose the means they see fit. 
The doxic association of radicalness with “street fighting gymnastics” (Cross, 
2003:8) and the “prestige associated with violence” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010:58) establish a 
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hierarchical relationship between alternative means of struggle on the accounts of their 
adherence to violence, and produce an undemocratic environment. The valorization of 
combative practices in primarily working through the images of male and able bodies, 
perpetuate “hegemonic notions of masculinity” (Razsa, 2013:514) and ableism 
(Morrigan, 2012). The potential translation of “the ‘meaningful’ political act into the 
boring violence of the everyday” (Sullivan, 2004:29), echoing the productive aspect of 
violence, challenges the liberation claims associated with violence. However, it is 
important not to take this criticism as one that essentializes gender, where violence is 
inherently associated with masculinity and nonviolence is associated with femininity.16 
While it makes sense to pay attention to the ways in which violence contributes to the 
gendered modes of power, this does not necessarily mean that violence is inherently 
part of a masculine domain. In fact, it is also quite possible that violent means “might 
effect a liberating reconfiguration of the pacified female gender identity that is part and 
parcel of bourgeois patriarchal social organization” (Sullivan, 2005a:28). Yet, this 
potentiality only disables an essentialized criticism, but not necessarily nullifies the 
valorization of “culturally dominant idioms of maleness: brute force and guile, 
determination and sang foid, bravado and brotherhood” (Cross, 2003:9). The creation of 
a “hardcore habitus” (Sullivan, 2005a:9, emphasis original) also downplays the 
questions of who can take part in this type of activism and who can afford what risks. 
The ideal subject constructed must have sufficient conditions first, to be able to 
participate, and second, have the luxury to afford the potential consequences.17 Such 
conditions, however, apply only to a limited group of participants, and an environment 
that fosters the “hardcore habitus” risks producing a hostile, exclusionary and 
undemocratic environment. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Care feminism, for instance, associates violence with male virtues, and care 
with female virtues. Seeing violence as inherently part of “men’s wars” (Roy, 
2009), care feminism defines nonviolence as the only viable option suitable with 
feminism (Churchil, 2005; Peach, 1994; Roy, 2008; Ruddick, 1989). For a 
detailed analysis of feminist ethics and the question of political violence see 
(Frazer & Hutchings, 2014; Hutchings, 2007; Sjoberg, 2012). 
 
17 Morrigan (2012) defines the sufficient criteria in US context as being (1) single 
and without family obligations, (2) healthy, able-bodied and not dependent on 
special medical care, (3) US-born American citizen, (4) White, (5) economically 
privileged, (6) having job security, (7) having a clean or semi-clean record, (8) 
male, straight and straight-looking, (9) not being a member of persecuted or 
prejudiced against social, cultural or religious group, (10) not be unhoused. 
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The affirmative function violence assumes for group identification, besides 
promoting taking risks, also operates through an exaltation of sacrifice. Similar to the 
martyrdom logic invoked in nonviolence, “activist politics is alienated into a fetishized, 
masochistic and circular confrontation with police” (Sullivan, 2005a:36). Violent 
confrontations then become tools for soothing “activist guilt – the sense of never doing 
enough to ‘change the world’” (ibid.:9).18 Equipped with a capacity it lacks (‘changing 
the world’), receiving the violence of the opponent takes on a satisfactory function. The 
satisfactory role violence assumes leads to a scenario where by “multiple forms of 
power are ignored and the liberating potential of some emancipatory gestures are 
exaggerated” (Cross, 2002:8). 
Taking part in riots, some have argued, works to solidify relations of solidarity 
(Dupuis-Déri, 2010a & 2010b; Gelderloos, 2010 & 2013; Juris, 2005 & 2008; Razsa, 
2013). Resonating with the awakening potential of violence as articulated by Sorel, the 
“common experience of state violence” (Razsa, 2013:513) produces a shared “sense of 
liberation” (Gelderloos, 2013:216). However, such formulation in being dependent on 
confrontation necessitates the opponent for the validation of the emergence of “affective 
solidarity” (Juris, 2005:63). That is, since it is through state’s violence that the 
“affirmation of common struggle – of an insurrectionary intimacy” (Razsa, 2013:513) is 
achieved, the state and its violence assume a central role for the configuration of 
resistant subjectivities. Along with the centrality of violence for the definition of actions 
as radical, it comes to a point in which resistance, or politics, cannot be defined without 
the state and its violence. Resistance as an act of claiming and asserting agency, in 
depending on the opponent’s actions to validate itself, subversively provides 
recognition to the opponent, as well as undermines and limits the agency of the actors. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Such articulation of guilt as motivation highly pertains to the discussions of 
privilege and the hierarchical order of grievances. The form of hierarchical order 
of grievances mentioned before in this chapter referred to the scenarios where 
particular lines of oppression were deemed more urgent and important. Here, on 
the other hand, such ranking is affirmed from outside. That is, the guilt derives 
paternally from the incapability of saving those whose problems are more urgent. 
Relying on the subversion (or misinterpretation) of the idea that “‘those most 
directly affected by oppression must lead their own struggle’” (Gelderloos, 
2010:15), the role for the privileged (defined arbitrarily rather than contextually) 
is limited to the position of “ally”. In such account, privilege is taken into hand as 
a static, measurable quality. This produces subject positions that “have nothing to 
fight for and inevitably tokenize or paternalize those whose struggles are deemed 
(more) legitimate” (ibidi.:16). 
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The articulation of political praxis as confrontation, in other words, inevitably becomes 
contingent on the opponent for validation. 
A similar trait is also evident in the argumentations that promote violence on the 
grounds that state promotes nonviolence (Churchill, 2007; Gelderloos, 2007). The idea 
is that whatever the state wants – as if state is an agent with deliberate intentions, 
motivations and wills-, the preferable course of action should be defined in opposition 
to it. Such an approach, beyond its simplistic construction of the state as an entity with 
clear motivations- similarly provides the state a central role. It promotes an 
understanding that generates itself as the negation of the opponent, rather than 
articulating its own agendas, actions and strategies. 
  Another argument for confrontational militant praxis is that it provides better 
publicity by “‘hijacking’ the […] media” attention (Juris, 2008:62). Because violence 
“sells”, the actions are given broader place in mainstream media, which then allows 
room for broader communication of the messages and discourses produced through 
action. The broader communication is taken to encourage broader participation (Dupuis-
Déri, 2010b; Juris, 2005) by “galvaniz[ing] them [fellow citizens] into action” 
(Goodway, 2012:10). While it is substantiated that violent forms of protests indeed 
attract broader attention of the mainstream media, whether they produce positive or 
negative effects is still an ongoing discussion (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a).19 Even if broader 
media coverage is taken to produce positive effects, however, this alone is a dangerous 
ground to adopt for deployment of violent means. The instrumental reasoning, though 
not in the same scope, is still prone to escalating violence without limitations through its 
end-orientation, as it is the case with formerly depicted instrumentalist accounts. 
 Even if confrontational militant praxis involves risks, black bloc, as nonlethal 
militant practices, such as “sporadic property destruction and fleeting confrontations 
with the police” (Thompson, 2010:23), is a relatively better choice. Also defined as 
means of “drawing attention to capital’s omnipresent symbols by targeting them with 
destructive actions” (Sullivan, 2004:16) through decisions taken collectively, 
deliberately and consensually (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a & 2010b), black blocs offer a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 It is important to emphasize that both arguments are open to contestation due to 
their reliance on the composition part of these narratives, which means the ways 
in which they are framed, and not on the reception part, which refers to the ways 
in which these narratives are interpreted. It is quite possible that different 
framings by different agents of mainstream media may have quite different 
interpretations by different audiences.  
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different conduct of confrontational militant praxis. As opposed to common 
misconceptions of them as groups (e.g. Mattos, 2012; Zúquete, 2013), black bloc “is not 
a group or a movement; it is a tactic” (Paris, 2010:321, emphasis original). The 
militancy enacted within black blocs, differing from riots, street fighting, and “‘random 
vandalism’”, violence deployed by black blocs is actually “highly political and usually 
carefully targeted” (WOMBLES, 2003, quoted in Sullivan, 2004:16). The violence of 
black blocs, that is to say, is an informed one, oriented towards pre-defined objects, 
emerging out of deliberations among the participants. 
Black blocs have both “practical and performative dimensions” (Juris, 2008:72, 
emphasis original), on the one hand, they are “the physical embodiment of a political 
vision” (Juris, 2005:421), and on the other they also have quite practical 
implementations such as “running barricades and forcing the police to withdraw” 
(Albertani, 2010:583), or “de-arresting”, freeing participants who have been arrested. 
What gives the black bloc the superior capacity attributed here, however, is not about 
what they enable as all of the above are quite possible without necessarily deploying 
black bloc tactics. The significance of black bloc, along with the forms in which 
decisions are made, lies in situating what actions stand for beforehand. Rather than 
loading actions with capacities they lack, which is the case for the defense of street 
fighting as revolutionary violence for instance, black block, ideally, acknowledges the 
rationale behind the deployed violence for what it is: to “communicate directed 
messages” (Juris, 2005:421).20 The black blocs, in this sense, are both educated and 
educative. Educated, because their violence is conscious, informed, selective and 
processual, and educative because it makes a point, a point of “a targeted and strategic 
expression of the emotion of anger, as well as an ethical assertion of the right to be 
angry” (Sullivan, 2004:24, emphasis original). 
Black bloc in being a tactic deployed by affinity groups on consensual terms, but 
not a defined group with membership, cannot be said to be exclusionary on its own 
(Paris, 2010). However, it is still essential to keep in mind the question of who can and 
who cannot adopt that tactic, as well as the issue of “turning [nonviolent protesters] –
without their consent- into targets of police violence” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a:63). It is, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 I do not mean to downplay symbolic forms resistant violence takes. What I 
intend to do is to oppose the translation of symbolic forms of violence to 
revolutionary ones. The discursive construction of symbolic forms of violence as 
revolutionary (in themselves) falsely attributes a wholesome transformative 
capacity, which then disrupts the ground for their evaluation.   
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therefore, important to emphasize that while black blocs offer a better start, they do not 
necessarily eliminate the problems of “the constitutive power at play in the construction 
of militant subjectivities” (Cross, 2003:9); the normative frame that devalues alternative 
means, thereby reducing the diversity of tactics to violent means alone (Albertani, 2010; 
Dupuis-Deri, 2010a; Gelderloos, 2007 & 2013; Sullivan, 2004); contributing to the 
formation of an undemocratic environment; and a confrontational loop through which 
opponent and its violence are reproduced endlessly.  
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
The defense of violence in the revolutionary frame includes arguments that rely 
on the of necessity and responsiveness/self-defensiveness of violence. The defense of 
violence on the grounds of necessity is established through end-orientation, where 
violence is either instrumentally or essentially necessary. As instrumental necessity 
refers to limitations forced by the context rendering violence an unfortunate but 
necessary means, for essential necessity approach, violence is inherently necessary for 
the desired end, as well as for the emergence of the subjects desiring that end. The 
approach that articulates violence as responsive, on the other hand, relies on the claim 
of the right to act back. 
Arguments of necessity work through prioritization of the achievement of the 
desired ends over the means deployed, and adopt expediency as the criterion for the 
sanction of violence. Expediency, adopted means’ capacity to bring about the desired 
ends, however, is quite difficult to assess neatly due to the improbability of precisely 
predicting what the outcome would be. The overemphasis on the end subordinates the 
present to the future. This, for the commission of violence, constitutes a great risk since 
the actions taken in the name of the ideal end may in fact produce quite distinct 
outcomes. More importantly, the construction of violence as expedient for the end 
produces a discursive association between violence and radicalness. Since violence is 
loaded with the capacity to bring about the desired changes, violence then becomes 
relative criterion upon which a particular act’s capacity for change is judged. Due to this 
association, and the “terms […] mediated by ‘necessity’ or by some over-arching 
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instrumental consideration” (Tormey, 2005:402), violence inherits a priori expediency 
credentials, which inhibit limiting criteria for the commission of violence. 
Besides the potential discordancy between the pursued and achieved results, the 
instrumental necessity approach renders violence’s secondary effects irrelevant. 
Violence, as opposed to its articulation in instrumental necessity approach, more often 
than not, is incapable of remaining instrumental. Rather, violence produces subjects and 
subjectivities. While the instrumental necessity approach deals with this problem 
through justification or excusal of violence, for the essential necessity approach, these 
effects are in fact welcome. In essential necessity approach, it is through the subjects 
produced by/through violent encounters that the desired end will be achieved. The 
celebration of violence without specification or limiting criterion, however, in 
essentializing violence as liberating in itself, obscures the question of “whose interests 
are served by this version of liberation” (MacKinnon, 1982:523). Combined with the 
discursive association between radicalness and violence, where militancy is taken “to 
indicate the progressive of revolutionary nature of a movement” (Nappalos, 2013:1) the 
necessity approaches risk producing violence in vain along with subjectivities that 
valorize violence for its own sake. 
 The current discussions on violence, though not necessarily exclusively so, refer 
to street politics and confrontations with the police, as opposed to revolutionary 
contexts. The arguments for confrontational militancy includes broader media attention 
and publicity; construction of “affective solidarities” (Juris, 2005) and “insurrectionary 
intimacies” (Razsa, 2013); and the implementation of “the right to be angry” (Sullivan, 
2004). 
The confrontational militant praxis, following the former accounts of 
revolutionary defenses, similarly risks producing a discursive association between 
violence and radicalness. While black bloc, as a tactic, offers a better potential, this is, 
more often than not, a mere potential that is not actualized at the empirical level 
(Sullivan, 2004 & 2005a). The right to violence “as an expression of dignified rage” 
(Memos, 2009:219), valid for black blocs as well, has a proclivity to reproduce the 
dogmatic form violence takes in confrontational politics that initiates a hierarchical 
order of legitimacy between alternative means, and whereby violent means benefit from 
the “cool-factor” (Zúquete, 2013:105). The militancy adopted further promotes a 
gendered power imbalance, not because violence is inherently phallic, but because of 
the established “affective vocabulary” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:196), through which 
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the qualities associated with violence (bravery, bravado, guile, heroism) resonate with 
values constructed as masculine.  
The construction of violent confrontations with the police as “doing something 
to change world”, finally, gives violence of the opponent a central role. The association 
of radicalness and violence, combined with the satisfactory role violence assumes, 
produces sacrificial subjectivities, which are reinforced by the opponent and its 
violence. The reliance on the opponent sets the way for the tendency of “creating 
situations where an excessive police response was predictable” (Hammond, 2015:305), 
escalating the overall violence. All in all, when violence is equipped with affectively 
satisfactory capacity within confrontational politics, which by definition, depend 
ontologically on the opponent, the opponent’s violence becomes a central theme for 
emancipation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
POLITICS OF THE ACT 
 
 
 
“In contrast with faith, hope is not for a future in the name of 
which we should sacrifice ourselves. No, it must be born 
from the very collective process as it happens. We should 
never sacrifice anything in the name of tomorrow – because 
it is poison.”  
Isabelle Stengers, A ‘cosmo-politics’ – risk, hope, change 
 
“Are we who live in the present doomed never to experience 
autonomy, never to stand for one moment on a bit of land 
ruled only by freedom? Are we reduced to either to nostalgia 
for the past or nostalgia for the future? Must we wait until 
the entire world is freed of political control before even one 
of us can claim to know freedom?” 
Hakim Bey, T.A.Z. 
 
 
 
 
The approaches to violence outlined in the previous chapter draw on the 
revolutionary contexts and confrontational militant praxis. The aim of this chapter is to 
introduce prefigurative politics and set the way for the next chapter, which offers a 
reconsideration of the prevalent frames for the approaches to violence in light of the 
prefigurative politics. After a (very) brief review of the literature on social movements 
and the major shifts within it, this chapter lays out the conceptual composition of 
prefiguration, (1) action orientation, (2) different articulations of temporality and 
success, (3) means/ends and instrumentality, and (4) approaches to power and 
organization. 
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4.1 From revolution to reform to prefigurative politics 
 
 
 
 Within the social movements literature, there is a distinction between forms of 
politics that aim total transformation of the system, conventionally called as Old Social 
Movements (OSMs), and New Social Movements (NSMs), which focus on improving 
the conditions within the current order (Crossley, 2002:149-191). OSMs, mostly 
referring to the period prior to 60’s, “privilege the transformatory role of the working 
class” (Mayo, 2005:73, quoted in Lederman, 2015:246), and look for an overall 
transformation. NSMs, on the other hand, acknowledge the availability of different axis 
of power other than class relationships, such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, 
race, environmental relations etc. (Buechler, 1995; Johnston et al., 1994; Melucci, 1980; 
Touraine, 1992; Offe, 1987). The distinction, at times leading to the disparagement of 
NSMs as “‘a new hedonistic culture’ of ‘personal freedom’” (Bagguley, 1992:14, 
quoted in Day, 2004:722), presents itself with a binary attachment of NSMs with 
reform, and OSMs with revolution (Touraine, 1992:143). The idea of a successful 
revolution for OSMs means the overtaking of the state power enabled by mass 
upheavals. NSMs, on the other hand, are more concerned with ameliorating the 
conditions of existence within the current order. Rather than posing a threat to the basis 
of the order, in other words, what they seek is to introduce a challenge to the power 
imbalance. Even if NSMs, like prefigurative praxis, insist on the coherence of the 
means and ends (Offe, 1987) and deny “accommodation to existing power and resist 
standard forms of co-optation” (Buechler, 1995:448), the ultimate focus is still on 
“politics of demand”, that is the attempt of “persuading an existing hegemonic 
formation to alter” its behavior (Day, 2004:727). Stated as such, as OSMs are interested 
in replacing/taking the power, NSMs are interested in shifting its concentration. 
Common in both is “a strong orientation to the state” (ibid.:723): OSM seeking to 
become it, NSM seeking to change its behavior.  
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A different form of politics, influenced by both OSM and NSM, emanated 
during 90’s that seeks neither to achieve nor to ameliorate state power.21 Called as 
prefigurative politics,22 this new form relies on an understanding of “direct action”, 
which refers to enacting the ideal in the present by “acting as if one is already free” 
(Graeber, 2006:214). While many have pointed out the “anarchist currents” within these 
movements (Arditi, 2007; Cross, 2003; Day, 2004 & 2005; Dixon, 2012; Epstein, 2001; 
Graeber, 2002 & 2006; Lederman, 2015; Luchies, 2012), a reading of these forms as 
(re-emergence of) anarchist politics would be misleading. Not only self-identification as 
“anarchists” among participants of prefigurative politics is highly rare (Day, 2005; 
Graeber, 2002), more importantly, prefigurative politics, to differing extents and among 
others, are influenced primarily from “feminist, ecologist, anti-racist, and queer 
struggles” (Gordon, 2008:32; Luchies, 2012; Williams, 2007). 
 
 
 
4.2 Prefigurative politics 
(DIY Revolution) 
 
 
 
The defining principles of “newest social movements” (Day, 2004 & 2005) is 
the rejection of “a politics, which appeals to governments to modify their behavior” 
(Graeber, 2002:62); commitment to prefiguration, that is, enacting the ideal in the 
present through action (Yates, 2004); affinity-based organizing and the focus on 
“autonomy and self-determination rather than a politics of dissent or demand” (Shantz, 
2012:3). 
The centrality of the emphasis of the process over outcome, and the 
experience/experimentation over demand has been criticized as a major weakness of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 I do not mean to imply that prefigurative forms of politics did not exist prior to 
90’s. Rather, I use emanated to refer to the popular adoption of prefiguration, 
which, temporally, corresponds to 90’s. 
 
22 Different names are available for this type of political action, such as direct 
action (Graeber, 2002 & 2006 & 2009); prefigurative politics (Gordon, 2008; 
Jeffrey & Dyson, 2014; Luchies, 2012; Sancho, 2014; Yates, 2015); horizontalism 
(Ancelovici, 2015), anti-oppression (Bevington & Dixon, 2007; Dixon, 2012; 
Cross, 2003; Luchies, 2012 & 2014); autonomism (Alcoff & Alcoff, 2015); and 
Newest Social Movements (Day, 2004 & 2005). I will be using prefiguration and 
prefigurative politics interchangeably.  
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prefiguration. The criticisms about the lack of precise demands include that 
prefigurative politics (1) lack the capacity for achieving a broader effect (Disalvo, 2015; 
Giri, 2013; cf. Yates, 2015); (2) due to the lack of conventional (read: hierarchical) 
organization, they are prone to disintegration (Farber, 2014; Giri, 2013; cf. Ancelovici, 
2015:5-6); and (3) either by creating comfort-zones within the current order (Disalvo, 
2015; cf. Gibson-Graham, 2006:111-120), by obsessing over “minor” issues of anti 
oppression within groups (Giri, 2013; cf. Luchies, 2012 & 2014), or by sticking to 
forms that will not last, prefiguration steals time and energy from the Revolution 
(Disalvo, 2015; Young & Schwartz, 2012; cf. van de Sande, 2013 & 2015). 
What these criticisms miss, however, is that prefiguration alters the frames in 
which these criticisms are relevant. Prefiguration operates in a different frame where the 
conventional understandings of “either revolution or reform”; the relationship between 
means and ends; the distinction between present and future within a “linear view of 
social change” (Maeckelbergh, 2011:15); and the approaches to power do not hold. 
Following sections dwell on (1) action-orientation;  (2) different articulations of success 
and temporality; (3) means/ends and instrumentality; (4) approaches to power and 
organization.  
 
 
 
4.2.1 (Direct-) Action-orientation, politics of the act 
(Freedom 2.3 (beta version)) 
 
 
Prefigurative politics, broadly defined as “enacting the ideal in the present”, 
refers to the processes aimed at “building alternative political, economic and cultural 
infrastructures within existing oppressive contexts” (Luchies, 2012:11). 
Experimentations that stem from the idealized conceptions of social relations lie at the 
core of prefigurative politics. Experimentation, or enacting the ideal in the present is 
used to refer to both actual creation of alternatives, and the “politically inflected way of 
doing protest” (Yates, 2014:3) such as adopting egalitarian, non-totalizing and consent-
based decision-making mechanisms. The definition of prefigurative politics as the 
“politics of the act” rather than “politics of demand” (Day, 2004 & 2005; Shantz, 2012) 
similarly reflects the dual conceptualization of what constitutes the “act”. Act may refer 
to forms that “act out a vision and to build” alternatives  (Epstein, 1991:123), as well as 
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to the forms of (horizontal and egalitarian) organization within the movement 
(Ancelovici, 2015; Graeber, 2013). 
The former narrow conceptualization is set to be limited to the forms that “act 
out a vision” through construction of observable/material projects (Beyer-Arensen, 
2000; Breines, 1989; Epstein, 1991).23 Such as projects include, but are not limited to, 
alternatives to capitalist market, production (Gibson-Graham, 2006) and consumption 
(Portwood-Stacer, 2012; Wilson, 2013); circulation of locally produced paper 
currencies defined by labor replacing “money”  (North, 2014); building alternative sites, 
such as the ecofeminist landdyke movement (Anahita, 2009); or entirely alternative 
communities, such as Zapatistas (Stephens, 2002; Kingsnorth, 2003:1-48); and (mostly 
squatted) political community centers for activism which also house alternative 
relations of production, consumption and distribution (Chatterton, 2010; Yates, 2014). 
The latter, on the other hand, includes the actualization of the desired “social relations 
within the activities and collective structures of the revolutionary movement itself” 
(Gordon, 2008:35) into the definition of prefiguration. For this second broader 
conceptualization, horizontal forms of organization; consensus based decision-making 
processes; attention to minority rights and autonomy; and constant negotiation of inner-
group dynamics prefigure the idealized form of sociality. The understanding of 
prefiguration adopted in this chapter accords with the broader second conceptualization 
since the forms of organization, or the ways in which protests are conducted constitute a 
“concrete model for one’s vision of a free society” (Graeber, 2009:210). Enacting the 
idea of “acting as if one was already free” within the political community is also a form 
of prefiguration for “the political practices the movement itself develops are part and 
parcel of the movement’s aims” (Maeckelbergh, 2012:211). The forms adopted, in other 
words, are not instrumental or separate, but are constitutive for the definition of the 
ideal (discussed in more detail in the following sections). 
The action-orientation is accentuated by the “direct” coming before it. That is, 
prefiguration does not simply evolve around the action, but through the ideals’ direct 
implementation. This, as opposed to “politics of demand”, refers to a direct involvement 
where action directly realizes the ideal. Differing from the “traditional narratives of 
emancipation” (Arditi, 2015:118) where actions are state-oriented, within prefiguration, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See Graeber (2005), Maeckelbergh (2011 & 2012), Portwood-Stacer (2012) and 
Yates (2014) for a detailed account of the debate regarding what 
constitutes/counts as prefiguration. 
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“the point [is] to engage in a politics of emancipation despite the state instead of against 
it” (Arditi, 2007:220, emphasis original). As a “powerful rebuttal of false dichotomy” of 
“reform versus revolution” (Young & Schwartz, 2012:233), prefigurative politics offer 
the grounds for the creation of an alternative sociality without appealing to the state or 
the government (Day, 2004:78; Graeber, 2002:9; Razsa & Kurnik; 2012:240-2; Wood, 
2014:3-4).  
 In the case of the politics of demand, the “state-directed claimsmaking” (Wood, 
2014:4) relies on the “the current hegemonic formation [to] recognize the validity of the 
claim […] and to respond in a way that produces an event of emancipation” (Day, 
2004:734). The politics of demand, or reform, in ultimately relying on the response of 
the opponent, inevitably works to “reproduce the conditions of its [demand’s re-] 
emergence” (ibid.:734). Prefiguration, on the other hand, “invent[s] a response that 
precludes the necessity of the demand and thereby breaks out the loop of the endless 
perpetuation of desire for emancipation” (ibid.:734, emphasis mine). Rather than 
inflicting changes by intervening to the regular functioning of the relations of power, in 
other words, the idea is to create alternatives through action without resorting to the 
state or other institutions. While at times (particularly in self-proclaimed anarchist 
fractions) depriving the state of the recognition is a deliberate agenda or a core 
principle, this is not necessarily always a pre-given and deliberately shared concern. 
Rather, the distance between institutions or “established channels” (Luchies, 2012:5) is 
more likely to derive from (be a by-product of) the prioritization of actions and 
experiences over narrowly defined equivalence of success as the outcome (rather than 
the process). 
 
 
 
4.2.2. Temporality & Success 
(From “Not now, comrade.” to “Right now, comrade!”) 
 
 
Relying on a notion of “politics as becoming”, prefiguration offers a different 
temporal configuration of the relationship between future and present. Rather than an 
understanding that “postpone[s] the good for after the struggle” (Stengers, 2002:256), 
for prefigurative politics the motivation is to “make ‘now’ work” (Jeffrey & Dyson, 
2014:27). Such articulation of temporality in which present and future converge, 
“actively subvert[s] the politics of waiting by embracing the immediate possibilities of 
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here and now” (Springer, 2014:408, emphasis original), and initiate the need to 
reconsider what constitutes “success” or “victory”. 
For prefiguration the criteria for success is “neither the outcomes, initial 
intentions, or the ends invoked” (van de Sande, 2013:237), but the experience itself. As 
the “either revolution or reform” frame takes success into hand as a matter of short- or 
long-time outcomes, prefiguration prioritizes process over outcome (Maeckelbergh, 
2011:6-8). Drawing on the occupation of Tahrir Square, for instance, van de Sande 
argues that Tahrir Square “housed a complete alternative ‘society-under-construction’” 
(2013:234), where “equality and democracy was lived” (ibid.:236, emphasis original). 
The significance of Tahrir Square within prefiguration frame is not limited to whether it 
lasts or what outcome it brings about. The significance also lies in its occurrence, and 
the forms it takes during its occurrence. The fact that democracy was lived in Tahrir 
Square, in mimicking the desired form of sociality, shifts the focus from the outcome to 
the process, which leads to the rejection of the outcome as the ultimate criterion for 
success. Experiment- and process-oriented success initiates a conceptualization that is 
defined in terms of the construction of “new intersubjective relations” (Razsa & Kurnik, 
2012:249); opening up possibilities (Arditi, 2015); and embodying alternative ways of 
being in the present (Graeber, 2002; Luchies, 2012; Sancho, 2014). 
The different conceptualization of success calls for different articulations of 
present and success than the ones in “either revolution or reform” frame. For the 
revolution, the significance of the actions partaken in the moment lies in their 
contribution to the ultimate end in the future. For the reform, on the other hand, the 
motivation is to make present relatively bearable through the compromises of the 
powerful opponent. Within such understanding, either present is rendered secondary for 
the future or vice versa: one either has to give up of the present and to focus on the 
eventual grand revolution to come –which, by the way, may never come at all-, or to 
focus on the present and condone oneself with partial achievements through the 
compromises of the opponent at the expense of the future.  
The inclusion of the future within prefiguration takes a different form, in which 
future and present are taken not into hand as distinct categories. Within prefiguration, 
the future ends are actualized in and incorporated into the present by attempting to 
“achieve the goals of revolution and reform here and now rather than putting them off 
to some distant future” (Day, 2005:215). As opposed to the former articulations where 
either future is prioritized over present, or vice versa, in other words, within 
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prefiguration, the relationship to the future is established through experimentation, 
where future and present merge in the course of action. What is defined as a weakness 
or deficiency, then, is actually a deliberate attempt for the “actualization of a future 
ideal in the ‘here and now’, thus bridging a temporal distinction between the two” (van 
de Sande, 2013:230). 
 However, this does not necessarily mean that within prefiguration future’s sole 
relevance is limited to the actions in the present. The embodiment of the future ideals in 
the present, “like rabbit holes of the Alice in Wonderland” works to “negotiate 
passageways between incommensurable worlds, to connect existing and possible ones” 
(Arditi, 2015:121-126). This not only “remove[s] the temporal distinction between the 
struggle in the present and a goal in the future” (Maeckelbergh, 2011:4), but also, quite 
materially, manifests the common phrase that “a different world is possible”. It is 
through experience that the creations of “new subjectivities that desire and are capable 
of democratic relations” (van de Sande, 2013:191, emphasis mine) are produced. The 
creation of comfort-zones within the current order, then, rather than stealing time and 
energy from the Revolution, actually creates revolutionary experiences and 
subjectivities (Arditi, 2015; Day, 2005, Luchies, 2012). 
 Related to the understandings of what constitutes success, another difference is 
the acknowledgement of the multiplicity of revolutions rather than a totalizing notion of 
a/the revolution. Rather than a grand narrative with specific routes, directions, and 
goals, what prefiguration offers, as experimentation implies, is a loose frame that is 
open to constant negotiation and renewal. As opposed to grand narratives of 
revolutions, where the future is pre-determined – as it is the case with particular strands 
of Marxism, for instance-, prefiguration abstains from providing a concrete picture of 
the ideal future (Day, 2005). While the convergence of future ideals and present conduct 
is essential, their coming together does not take the future as the starting point. It is not 
that a stable, clear, materially visualized “ideal” as “a blueprint, a map, a masterplan” 
(Springer, 2014:412, emphasis original) comes first according to which actions are 
shaped. Rather, ideals exist, emerge and materialize in the present, and through actions 
and experimentations. The ideal, in short, does not connote a blueprint for the 
predetermined vision of a future society. Because the concern is “not just the content of 
current modes of domination, but also the forms that give rise to them” (Day, 2005:4, 
emphasis original), the problematization of the forms, along with the content, implies a 
broader definition of the ideal. What ideal, then, refers to is more of a cumulation of 
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codes shaped by virtues (Franks, 2010:135-160) and values, such as anti-
authoritarianism, egalitarianism, anti-oppression, autonomy etc. 
The refusal, rather being unable, to come up with specific demands (van de 
Sande, 2013:227), reflects the inclination to initiate a form politics that emphasizes self-
determination and autonomy (Cross, 2003; Sancho, 2014; Wood, 2014). The 
dynamicity allowed by loosely defined agendas enable and foster experimentation 
central to prefiguration.24 The vision of the future and the articulation of the relationship 
between present and the future, similarly, accord with the underlying concerns about 
refraining from a totalizing understanding of revolution.  
 
 
 
4.2.3 Means/ends & instrumentality 
(Against the omelette: a note from the eggs) 
 
 
Rather than an understanding that relies on the separation of means and ends, for 
prefiguration, the constituted relationship between ends and means is that of 
concordance. Due to the focus on directness and action within prefiguration, actions 
themselves are goals rather than instruments deployed for distinct goals/ends. In 
resemblance to “vanishing mediators” rendering the “medium as the message”, within 
prefiguration, means become ends in themselves (Arditi, 2015:113-115). Acts of 
resistance, in other words, are not mere tools adopted for grander achievements, but in 
themselves are representative and part of further goals. The political conduct and 
means/ways of organization, then, are not instrumental but rather are considered as 
spaces for experimenting with and enacting the ideal (Maeckelbergh, 2011). This is also 
why prefiguration is not “abandoned when it is not strategically valuable” (Jeffrey & 
Dyson, 2014:7) for the motivation behind its deployment is not purely instrumental or 
strategical. 
Because of the configuration of the action as central, this is not necessarily an 
exteriorly articulated criterion. The notion of “experienc[ing] what you are fighting for 
while you are fighting for it” (Arditi, 2015:119, emphasis mine) inevitably facilitates the 
satisfaction of the consistency criteria. Since actions are already at the center, and are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Ancelovici (2015), Sancho (2014), van de Sande (2013) argue that the 
horizontal forms of organization in allowing “individualized participation” 
(Sancho, 2014:392) lead to broader participation of “new-comers”, who have 
remained distant to politics/acvitism (cf Yates, 2014).  
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not deemed as mere instruments but as parts and reflections of broader motivations, the 
correlative nature of means and ends is more of a description than an enforced dictum. 
The approach to means and ends, in other words, is not a predetermined recipe but 
rather is a reflection since an instrumental distinction between means and ends, actions 
and goals is not evident in the first place. Prefiguration, in its reliance on the centrality 
of action, in other words, presupposes consistency. The relationship between means and 
ends for prefiguration, then, -almost tautologically- aims to secure consistency between 
the actions and what is considered as ideal. This means that if anti-oppression is a 
relevant concern for the ideal, then, the political actions partaken should be consistent 
and conform to/concord with the anti-oppression norms, as in means and ends within 
prefiguration frame “should be of the same substance” (Gordon, 2008:98, emphasis 
mine).  
However, such conceptualization comes at the risk of a simplified and reductive 
depiction since means and ends are multiple; not all means are ends in themselves; and 
attributing prefiguration capacity to each and every act would not make much sense. 
Therefore, it should be emphasized that the concordance, or being of the same 
substance does not necessarily present itself in the form of a strict guideline for action. 
What prefiguration offers is “an alternative approach to externally imposed means ends 
analysis” (van de Sande, 2013:237) rather than a straightforward code of “be the change 
you want to see” (ibid.:233). 
A common practice of painting walls, for example, clearly does not “mirror” the 
changes desired (Yates, 2015:17-18). This is why prefiguration does not simply 
correspond to “be the change you want to be”. In such formulation of “be the change 
you want to be”, the desired change comes first, it is already evident and clear, 
according to which action is shaped. What prefiguration offers is not the imposition that 
“let your every action replicate your ideal”. The ideal enacted/mirrored in the present is 
not a rigidly defined picture according to which actions are shaped, but rather is a 
“continuous but never permanent” process (Maeckelbergh, 2012:231). Since ideal, or 
the change desired is not pregiven, but is constantly negotiated in and through 
experimentation with regard to the codes, values and principles at the present moment, 
there does not exist a concrete, materially constructed ideal that could be used as the 
reference point in the first place. Actions, then, are prefigurative, and conform to the 
consistency principle to the extent of their adherence to norms comprising the ideal. 
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The primary importance for the articulation of consistency as opposed to the 
instrumental construction of means towards distinct ends is the initiation of a different 
conceptualization that promotes “principle over expediency” (Cross, 2003:4). The 
emphasis on consistency first and foremost works to deny articulations that render 
means as secondary compared to the ends they are deployed for. The denial of a 
consequentialist moral frame, where actions are judged by the outcomes they lead to, 
accords with, if not relies on, the correlative construction of means and ends (Franks, 
2010). Such framing disables the legitimization of otherwise unacceptable actions. The 
consistency criteria, in other words, not only provides a positive reference ground for 
actions, but more importantly inhibits “ends justify means” rationale. This is different 
from arguing that “ends do not justify means” for such objection presupposes a neat 
distinction between ends and means. What is opposed here is the underlying assumption 
that means and ends are factually separate, and accordingly could be separately judged. 
The argument, in other words, is neither that “ends do not justify means”, nor simply 
that “ends and means are not separate” as either assertion could be easily refuted with 
examples. It is not that means and ends are essentially, inherently and inextricably 
connected; since similar means may bring about quite distinct ends just as similar ends 
may be achieved by quite distinct means. Neither it is safe to argue that ends do not 
justify means, since several instances may be provided where a particular means, such 
as cutting off someone’s arm, unjust on its own, may become justified in a scenario 
where it is done for the purposes of medical care.25 
Rather, what the consistency criteria does is to problematize the abstracted 
separation of means and ends, point to the constitutive relationship between them 
disabling a neat separation, and to offer an alternative approach for their adoption in 
politics (Ancelovici, 2015; Luchies, 2012; van de Sande, 2013). The argument is that 
means and ends, while having the potential to be separate to some extent, should 
“become effectively indistinguishable” in politics (Graeber, 2009:210). This not only 
provides a limitation for means, but also presupposes a different conceptualization of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 While this example is not quite suitable for an analogy of the means-ends 
relationship within prefiguration, in the case of cutting someone’s arm, the 
consistency criteria is interested in the way in which mutilation is performed. 
With the fixed desired ending as saving the person’s life, for instance, there are 
still multiple ways of doing it. What prefiguration frame underlines is that how 
you perform the mutilation is relevant. If the underlying principle in saving the 
person’s life is the “respect for life”, then the way in which procedure is 
performed should stick to that code.  
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ends as ideals as argued above. Because means are ends in themselves, and because 
ideal ends are defined in relation to principles, the conventional separation of means and 
ends falls short within the prefiguration frame. What coherence principle offers, then, is 
initiation of criteria for the judgment of actions on their own terms.  
 
 
 
4.2.4 Approaches to power, organization & micropolitics 
(Shitting on all vanguards of this planet collectively) 
 
 
The approach to power within prefiguration is established in great relation to the 
consistency principle and action-orientation. The inclination towards experimentations 
that accord with the ideal, works as a defining ground for the forms of organization. The 
attempts to engage in politics that concord with the ideals, in other words, lead the way 
for micropolitics, decision-making processes, divisions of labor and assignments, 
distribution of resources etc.  
The modus operandi of prefiguration, in its formation and application, ultimately 
aims to “redesign power’s operation” (Maeckelbergh, 2011:13). Also referred to as “de-
centralization”, the idea is not to abolish power per se (Arditi, 2007; Holloway, 
2002:19-41), but to distribute it in a way that promotes equality and autonomy over 
hierarchy. De-centralization, similarly, “means not fewer centers but more” (Gordon, 
2008:66). In line with understanding of power as a relation that accumulates through 
nodes, rather than a possession (Foucault, 1972), in other words, the idea is not to let 
power go away but to re-organize its accumulation in a fashion that disallows relations 
of oppression. The political conducts in prefigurative politics reflect such endeavor of a 
multi-centered organization of power (Cross, 2003: 4-5; Graeber, 2002).  
Forms of organization primarily aim to construct “radically inclusive and 
empowering forms of political communication” (Luchies, 2012:1). Direct or 
participatory democracy is a common/central demand enacted and experimented with 
(Hardt & Negri, 2004; Maeckelbergh, 2009 & 2011; van de Sande, 2013: 227 – 232; 
Sancho, 2014:387; Wood, 2014:2; Yates, 2015:3). Commitment to principles of anti-
oppression, which is set to embody different combinations of a full range of anti-‘s, 
such as sexism, heteronormativity, authority, racism, capitalism, imperialism, ableism, 
speciesism etc., is enacted in the forms of organization, which are horizontal, 
“egalitarian, participatory, deliberative and consensual” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010:41). The 
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focus on anti-oppression, rendering power concentration itself as a form of oppression, 
relies on an intersectional analysis and provides room for “creative coalition-building 
attuned to the ways in which race, class, gender, ability and sexuality are interwoven 
with the power of the state, market and culture” (Luchies, 2014:108). The assemblies, 
workshops, small groups are formed with the intents of forestalling “ideological 
monolithisms […] imbued with sectarianism”, which have been taken as sources that 
perpetuate oppressive relationships (Memos, 2009:226). The decision-making 
processes, relatedly, work on consensual terms aiming to maximize freedom, without 
enforcing a totalizing unity and the overrepresentation of particular axis of power at the 
expense of others.26  
While “quite different textures” of horizontal organizations emerge in different 
contexts (Razsa & Kurnik, 2012:251), consensus is central to the decision-making 
processes (Luchies, 2012:13; van de Sande, 2013:232). Consensus, however, does not 
directly correspond to the aim of “making everyone agree”. The idea is to establish a 
sort of equilibrium between autonomy and consensus, in hopes to allow room for 
everyone to act as they see fit without providing a loose frame in which “anything 
goes”. Echoing the directness aspect of prefiguration and its critical approaches to 
totalizing narratives of a revolution over revolutions, the underlying concern for the 
organizations of decision making processes is to come up with ways “to incorporate 
conflict, not to subsume it under a semblance of forced consensus” (Nunes, 2004:8, 
quoted in Maeckelbergh, 2012:??), without giving up of the core principles (the anti-‘s). 
Affinity groups, workshops, councils, forums and assemblies constitute the 
backbone of the organization structure  (Dupuis-Déri 2010; Jeffrey & Dyson, 2014; 
Maeckelbergh, 2011 & 2012; Razsa & Kurnik, 2012). While it is not possible to 
universalize a particular form, usually, decisions are made within smaller groups and 
taken to the broader group. Ideally, the broader groups, or the spokes-councils do not 
hold a coercive power over the decisions of smaller groups (Dupuis-Déri, 2010:52). 
Even if in Occupy Wall Street (OWS), for instance, all decisions were subjected to 
general assembly’s approval (Razsa & Kurnik, 2012:244), this does not necessarily 
mean that general assembly in OWS had a delegation authorization; decisions were still !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Sullivan (2005) offers a deeply engaged and striking account on the ways in 
which vertical forms of organizations produced “abuse of power” and “abusive” 
relationships at the ESF (European Social Forum) organizational process, 
emblematical of the forms of organization that are not attuned to inner-
hierarchies. 
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taken on a consensual manner. The primary function of workshops in OWS was to 
develop proposals that would then be carried to the general assembly. The proposals in 
15 May (15M) Movement in Barcelona similarly emerged from smaller working 
groups, taken to the general assembly and open to discussion. In the case of objections 
and interventions, the proposal is sent back to the working group (Maeckelbergh, 2012). 
In Occupy Montreal as well, the working committees and affinity groups, while “being 
relatively autonomous”, were still “accountable to the [General Assembly] (Ancelovici, 
2015:7). In Occupy Slovenia, on the other hand, each group – or individual – had the 
space to organize the way they saw fit. The assembly was not the “primary-decision 
unit”, rather was a space for intercommunication between different autonomous 
workshops (Razsa & Kurnik, 2012:244). As these examples imply, the relationship 
between autonomy and consensus is not a strictly defined one, but rather emerges out of 
a dynamic process in relation to specific contexts that gives rise to them. 
 
 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter has introduced prefiguration, the form of politics that relies on the 
idea of enacting the ideal in the present, which constitutes actions as central. Differing 
from the prevalent rhetorics of social transformation that set out a blueprint for future 
ideals, within prefiguration present, future and ideals merge in action through 
experimentations. Ideals, in the lack of a future as the arrival point, are defined through 
norms, codes and principles, mostly constituted by “anti-‘s”, as specified forms of axis 
of power that produce oppression, such as sexism, capitalism, racism, ableism, 
heteronormativity etc. 
Prefigurative politics also initiates a different analysis of means and ends, and 
offers a coherency principle. The coherency principle refers to the rejection of 
instrumental reasonings tending to subjugate means to the ends. The rejection is not 
only because instrumentality undermines the means’ relevance, but also because an 
understanding of a definitive end for whose sake actions are partaken is not evident in 
the first place. Coherency principle, however, is also different from the understanding 
that calls for a unity between means and ends. Rather, coherency, as suggested by the 
name, relies on the idea of concordance between actions and ideals, defined by the 
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codes of anti-‘s. The approaches to power and forms of organization are shaped in ways 
that abide by the coherency principle. Micropolitics, consent, deliberation, and direct 
democracy are central concerns, which are informed by an understanding of autonomy, 
but also are limited by the anti’s, ensuring the relevance of current problems.  
Due to different configurations pertaining to action, temporality, means/ends 
relationship and power relations, the formerly depicted defenses of violence become 
incompatible for the prefiguration frame. Valid for both instrumental and essential 
necessity accounts is an end-oriented theorizing, which falls short in the lack of an 
instrumental logic, and a pre-defined end as the arrival point. The emphases on “here 
and now” over “then and there”, and the constitution of actions in themselves 
interlocutors of change rather than instrumental steps taken towards a determinate 
future, in other words, run counter to the formations within end-oriented approaches.  
As for the violence as self-defense approach, the ground for action within self-
defense approach is inevitably constructed as reactive to the harm done, which 
presupposes the opponent. For prefiguration, however, the idea is to initiate a proactive 
form of political conduct, which relies on an ethical reasoning grounded on the right to 
live a good life here and now, and by implication renders the opponent politically 
irrelevant. This irrelevancy, however, is mostly valid for conceptual level, since the 
opponent, mostly the state, inserts itself to the spaces of prefiguration, making 
irrelevancy harder to generate at the empirical level. But even so, next chapter argues 
that violence emerging within the prefigurative frame offers a better ground for the 
preclusion of the problems associated with former defenses of militant praxis, and 
secures a ground for their problematization. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
VIOLENCE AND PREFIGURATION 
 
 
 
 
“[A] revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or 
painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so 
refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, 
courteous, restrained and magnanimous.” 
Mao Tse-tung, Report on an investigation of the peasant 
movement in Hunan  
 
“Washing the dishes is revolutionary.” 
Yvonne Yen Liu, Where is the color in Occupy? 
 
 
 
The accounts of violence and nonviolence outlined in previous chapters operate 
in a way that is dependent on the opponent and its violence. Their formation of separate 
ends in a two-sided spectrum works to provide dogmatic forms of association, which 
does not leave room for criticism and alternatives. In both cases, received or perpetrated 
violence assumes a central role for the achievement of desired ends. Due to the reliance 
on the opponent in the theorization of violence and nonviolence, confrontation becomes 
vital. The formulation of political conduct as such is trapped into the “politics against 
X”, whereby X becomes central to the articulations of what constitutes the act and 
success. The configuration of opponent’s violence as positively contributive to the 
outcome, in turn, perpetuates the valorizations of victimhood and suffering. 
Prefiguration, on the other hand, operates in a mode that is incompatible with 
the ethical reasonings of formerly depicted accounts, such as instrumentality, the idea of 
a unitary, universally applicable truth, and the constitution of political acts as 
accumulating towards a determinate future. The rejection of these ethical reasonings 
enable the preclusion of problems deriving from them, such as the subjugation of 
present (problems) for the sake of a future to come; instrumental, end-oriented and 
necessity based defenses that disable critical commitments; and a unitary, generalizable 
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notion of a revolution. The action-orientation, in a similar vein, has a potential to 
forestall the construction of sacrificial habitus and the centrality of violence by 
operating in a frame that renders the opponent irrelevant. The emphases on autonomy, 
micropolitics, and the approach to power, finally, beforehand deny the dictation of a 
particular means (either violent or nonviolent) as the possible course of action, and 
thereby offering room for both violent and nonviolent means. Yet, all of these are 
conceptual limitations, which are not necessarily effective at the empirical level. Due to 
the state’s willingness and ability to make itself relevant, the potential problems 
associated with confrontation and militancy still arise within prefigurative politics. 
Differing from former accounts, however, prefiguration allows room the contestation of 
problems. 
This chapter, in short, argues that violence within prefiguration frame, while 
being quite incapable of eliminating potential problems associated with militant praxis, 
at the very least, has a potential to impede some of them. But more importantly, when it 
does fail to impede them, it secures the ground for criticism and reflexivity, and 
reflection. The problems that still remain unresolved are referred to in the final section.  
 
 
 
5.1 Why defense of violence, and not nonviolence? 
 
 
 
 Common sense implies a unity between prefiguration and nonviolence for both 
knit values and actions together, and offer a different analysis of means and ends than 
the instrumental logic, calling the question of “how come a defense of violence, and not 
nonviolence, is feasible within the prefiguration frame?”.  
First of all, dogmatic nonviolence as a form that prohibits particular forms of 
action beforehand contradicts with autonomy and self-determination, which are central 
to prefiguration. Autonomy and self-determination acknowledge that people are capable 
of deciding what works for them, and promote the understanding that everyone should 
act as they see fit.27 Yet, nonviolence, by definition, excludes violent forms of action !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 This, as argued in previous chapter, is not a frame in which “everything goes”, 
but one with certain limitations. But these limitations do not assert “what is to be 
done”, rather, are aimed to secure the room for everyone the act as they see fit in a 
way implemented by the anti-‘s. Sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia, in this 
vein, are not included into the definition of “acting as one sees fit”.  
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beforehand; whereas there is room for nonviolence within the defense of violence, such 
space does not exist within nonviolence. Taken as such, nonviolence comprises a 
dogma, setting strict limitations for the catalogue of permitted actions.  
The dogma, first and foremost, traverses the “epistemological humility” claims 
of nonviolence (Atack, 2011; Gandhi, 2001; King Jr, 1991). Proponents of nonviolence 
argue that due to the impossibility of a neat certainty that one’s actions comply with the 
“truth” and the forms of action dictated by it, by abstaining from violent conduct, in 
case of a wrong doing one only risks causing harm to oneself. While the argument 
seems to acknowledge the unavailability of the truth, it still operates in a frame that 
assumes a particular universal truth. The uncertainty refers to the confirmation of the 
truth rather than its existence, which assumes the possibility of a unitary truth. The 
rejection of violence, in this sense, is an example of a unitary truth, which is taken as a 
universal dictum applicable everywhere and to everyone. Prefiguration, however, relies 
on the availability of multiple truths. In the words of the participant GA7 in Dupuis-
Déri, (2010a:64); 
“I know perfectly well that I don’t have all the answers on the subject of 
violence/nonviolence, so I’m not going to prevent people from doing what they want to 
do; I don’t want that sort of power.” 
Taken as such, the prefiguration frame enhances the ethical and epistemological 
humility by including the assertions of nonviolence to the partial and multiple truths.  
More importantly, the quote above underlines the power associated with setting 
limitations. The idea of setting the ground for what is acceptable is taken as a form of 
power. Called by Foucault as “subjugated knowledges”, in relation to the constitution of 
the supremacy of nonviolence discourse, alternative means are “disqualified as 
inadequate to their task” (Foucault, 1972:82). The disqualification, in defining the limits 
of the norm, works to “validate the ‘true’ definition of radical politics” (Dorfman, 
2011:6), and reinforces the authoritarianism of nonviolence discourse (Dupuis-Déri, 
2011; Gelderloos, 2013). But it is important to underline that the authoritarianism does 
not come from the adherence to nonviolence, rather from its generalization. The 
assumed “positional superiority” (Cross, 2003:8) and the authoritarianism associated 
with it are sustained through the disregard for the different subject positions, and the 
different contexts designated by them.  
The supposed legitimacy of the order and the criminalization of alternative 
means constitute a second incompatibility between the binding of dogmatic nonviolence 
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and prefiguration. The reliance on the “acting as if one was already free” cannot be 
realized within the nonviolence frame because of the legitimacy of the order discourse 
inherent to nonviolence thought. The formulation of nonviolence as exempting the state 
of the nonviolence restrictions affirms the state as a legitimate opponent and does not 
problematize the state, its violence, and the social conditions of the possibility of state 
violence. Setting the viable options as limited to the established channels, a form of 
action that operates outside the conventional political field cannot fit into the 
nonviolence frame. 
 Yet, it has been argued that violence should be alien to prefiguration, and that 
nonviolence is more compatible with the means/ends configuration in prefiguration 
(Carter, 2005; Martin, 1989 & 2001; Springer, 2011). The argument is that since 
prefiguration promotes the inseparability of means and ends, violence should have no 
place within prefiguration. However, while it is true that nonviolence is part of the 
ideal, such simplistic binding of prefiguration and nonviolence does not hold on several 
accounts.  
 First, the relationship between means and ends within prefiguration differs from 
the one in nonviolence. Nonviolence argues for “be the change you want to see” 
drawing on the idea that the means and ends are inherently/essentially inseparable. 
Prefiguration, on the other hand, does not construct the act as the blueprint of the ideal. 
The ideal, as opposed to a clearly visualized version of a sociality, comprises of 
particular norms and values. Rather than being subjected to a test of whether they 
directly represent the idealized future, actions are judged by their adherence/accordance 
to these codes. But if equality and egalitarian social relations are part of the ideal, and 
given the hierarchy producing potential of violence, should it not by nature follow that 
violence should be rejected? 
 While it is true that violent means are prone to contributing to the formation of 
hierarchical relationships, it is a potential risk, negativity about violence. The problem 
with the formulation of the question above is that it “mistake[s] the negativity of 
violence for its defining feature, instead of it being of a property of that feature” 
(Gordon, 2008:87, emphasis original). Violence always brings about risks, but these are 
potentialities, which may or may not be realized. Particularly because of the 
configuration of the ideal as more than a blueprint, and the emphasis on 
experimentation, prefiguration –while incapable of eliminating the risks wholly- 
provides the grounds for scrutinization and problematization of the risks. The relevance 
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of violence for prefiguration then is about the ways in which negative potential of 
violence is managed.  
  Second, the binding of prefiguration and nonviolence works only if the ideal is 
reduced to a particular form of nonviolence. Yet, the desired form of nonviolence, as 
lack of violence, refers to a “voluntarily non-violent society”. “If lack of violence were 
the only issue”, Gordon further argues,  
 
   “a hypothetical totalitarian state, in which the threat of Draconian 
sanctions is so effective that all citizens obey the law and the state 
consequentially does not need to ever actually use violence” 
 
would correspond to the satisfaction of the ideal  (ibid.:98, emphasis original). 
However, not only nonviolence is not the only goal, but also the desired form of 
nonviolence is voluntary. Even in ideal conditions “violence would still exist […] if 
someone chose to perpetrate it” (ibid.:98). What is relevant for prefiguration is more 
about the elimination of the social conditions of the possibility of violence than the 
elimination of violence per se. In other words, the desired form of nonviolence relates to 
the context in which the systematic violence does not exist, and thereby eliminating the 
conditions for the possibility of resistant violence. 
 This relates to the final discrepancy for the binding of prefiguration and 
nonviolence, which is about the contextual limitations disallowing a generalized 
realization of the desired form of nonviolence. The conceptualization of nonviolence 
that excludes the state’s violence for the satisfaction of nonviolence criteria, puts burden 
of nonviolence is only on the resistant parties. Prefiguration, however, means “acting as 
if one was free” and not “acting as if state’s violence does not exist”. It is particularly 
about the creation of spaces where state does not exist. And in those settings, the ideals 
pertaining to nonviolence are already enacted within the group, and thereby conform to 
the coherence principle. Because the focus is on the ways in which ideals are 
reconstituted here and now, the relationships formed between participants in being 
nonviolent indeed comply with the ideal. 
 All of these, however, do not necessarily mean that the idea of nonviolence is 
incorrigibly incompatible with prefiguration. What does not fit is the dictation of 
nonviolence as the sole course of action; ignoring the availability of different subject 
positions; assuming the legitimacy of the state and the order; and sustaining a positional 
superiority. What is opposed here, then, is not the idea of nonviolence per se, but the 
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ways in which nonviolence is conceptualized as the categorical, dogmatic and assertive 
rejection of violence. Accordingly, what prefiguration, ideally, offers is a frame in 
which neither violence nor nonviolence are dictated as binary and mutually exclusive 
means of political conduct. 
 
 
 
5.2 Dependence on violence and the opponent 
 
 
 
The definition of success in nonviolence as convincing the powerful to abstain 
from abusing its power, first and foremost, normalizes the power imbalance. Without 
problematizing the power imbalance in which some rule whereas some are ruled over, 
the concern for nonviolence is to ameliorate the relations of power between these two 
abstract categories of rulers and subjects. Rather than aiming to challenge the positions 
of rulers and subjects, in other words, nonviolence is aimed at alleviating the 
relationship between them. This refers to a conceptualization of power and politics 
reduced to the relations of compassion and convincing through redemptive suffering. 
The valorization of suffering as central mechanism for nonviolence risks initiating a 
habitus, where subjectivities are affirmed through self-sacrifice and victimhood.  
For the defenses of violence, on the other hand, particularly in the cases where 
defense of violence takes a dogmatic form, whereby diversity of tactics is translated into 
violent means alone, violence similarly risks assuming a central role. The discursive 
associations between radicalness and violence imply a reduced form of politics as “a 
reactive opposition that […] reinforces the power that is, by definition, present in 
opposition to its resistance” (Sullivan, 2004:29). The activist habitus formed in such 
context also fosters sacrificial subjectivities that situate violent confrontations as ritual 
experiences of cleansing from the activist guilt. The willingness for confrontation with 
the police then becomes affirmative for the activist identifications, as markers of 
commitment. The configuration of the ground for action as deriving from guilt, dissent 
and victimhood produces subjectivities fed by narratives of “underdog heroism” 
(Jansen, 2009:398) and sacrifice. Within such “hardcore habitus” (Sullivan, 2005a), not 
only participation is limited to particular –and limited- subject positions, but also the 
political sphere is defined in terms of opposition, which presupposes the opponent. 
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Valid for both accounts is a formulation where the dependence on the opponent 
and its violence produces an “affective pedagogy” (Allen, 2009:170, quoted in Razsa, 
2015:144) that perpetuates, if not promotes, victimhood and suffering. The “pride in 
confronting the police and being arrested” (Hammond, 2015:305)”, sustained by the 
affirmative function of the opponent, initiates a process of identification built on 
victimhood and heroism. Victimization, “an act [of harm] perpetrated against a person 
or a group”, deriving from the opponent’s violence, translates into victimhood, defined 
as “a form of collective identity based on that harm” (Jacoby, 2015:513). Without the 
harm, the collectivity cannot define itself. The actors, in this vein, are reduced to 
“perpetual victims” (Ruins, 2002: 4) assuming the role of the “tragic hero”, a subject 
incapable of controlling the ends, but yet “is able to recognize and accept responsibility 
for his [sic] actions” (Frazer & Hutchings, 2007:192). 
The willingness to bear with the consequences with pride as affirmative and 
constitutive of resistant subjectivities creates an ontological link between the actors and 
the opponent. Either through “redemptive suffering” or the ritual cleansing function 
violence assumes, the opponent and its violence become central. The place attributed to 
the violence of the opponent as positively contributive to the outcome, in other words, 
encourages sacrifice and suffering. Validation, in both accounts, comes exteriorly and 
violently. 
The action-orientation within prefiguration provides the necessary framework 
for the preclusion of such construction of violence –whether deployed by agents or the 
opponent- as central for validation. Due to the proactive nature of prefiguration, neither 
opponent, nor its violence is predetermined as necessary; actions are pivotal on their 
own terms. The reactive subjectivities, which by definition rely on the opponent, 
similarly are denied beforehand. The ground for actions within prefiguration is defined 
through the hope, imagination and experimentation of alternatives, which prioritize 
subjects of the action over the objects of the action. Action defined as enacting the 
ideal, in other words, relies on the “right to live a good life here and now” and initiate a 
different articulation of the relationship between actors and the opponent. 
It is primarily due to the idea of “acting as if one was already free” that the 
preclusion of a mutually constitutive relationship between the actors and the opponent is 
secured. However, it is important not to mistake such disregard for the state as a 
delusionary form of ignoring it. The idea is not to assume its absence, but rather is a 
denial to recognize its legitimacy claims, which are confirmed and perpetuated through 
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the politics of demand. While acknowledging its existence, in other words, its existence 
is deemed illegitimate. Actions, similarly, are not formed by thinking about the ways in 
which to deny recognition, which would mean still defining actions in relation to the 
opponent. The motivation is to act out as one desires, whereby the denial of recognition 
incidentally comes as a by-product. The course of action, as performative freedom, 
renders the state irrelevant. 
However, more often than not, state and its military forces insert themselves due 
to their willingness and ability to violently suppress the zones of performative freedom. 
Despite the formulation that excludes the state from the picture, it is to some extent true 
that “utopian experiments survive only while the rulers tolerate them” (Disalvo, 
2015:282).28 And when the state performs its existential tasks, confrontation becomes 
inevitable. So even if prefiguration implies a disregard for the state, and offers the 
grounds for the preclusion of the emergence of discursive forms of sacrificial and 
redemptive violence at the conceptual level, such aspiration is not easily satisfied 
empirically. This means that even if action-orientation disables a form of engagement 
where violence becomes central for validation, it is not feasible to argue that it 
precludes the emergence of confrontational violence altogether. Yet, I argue, this form 
of violence is a by-product that has no essential value for the actors deploying them and 
the actions for which they are deployed. Because violence assumes no central value for 
validation, in other words, its emergence takes the form of a by-product, which may or 
may not emerge.  
First of all, the resistant violence’s emergence is contextually dependent on 
oppressive violence. Since either type of violence does not assume a central value for 
validation, their emergence has no determinative function. That is, no meaning is lost on 
behalf of the action, if the oppressive violence does not emerge. This is primarily 
different from the former articulations of militant praxis, where the definition of 
resistance becomes ontologically dependent on the oppressive violence. Here, resistant 
violence emerges quite materially with the intent of “literally defend[ing] these spaces” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 I have reservations for the use of “tolerance” here, since it assumes a power 
concentration that is inconceivably unchallengeable. When the actions gain a 
ground that pose a threat to the constitution of ruler positions, it is definitely not 
toleration.   
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of experimentation (Maeckelbergh, 2011:14).29 The resistant violence here aims to 
secure the duration of the “liberation of a particular area (of land, of time, of 
imagination)” (Springer, 2014:412). The liberation potential, then, is still located in the 
liberated area, and not on violence.  
Such formulation of resistant violence as defending a liberated area, however, 
tediously evokes nation-state rhetoric with the notions of a glorified territory and the 
military forces fighting on its behalf. Yet, the territory is defined on different terms 
from the one in nation-state rhetoric on two important points. First, here, as it is the case 
with resistant violence, territory does not have an intrinsic, essential value.30  The 
territory, thought not necessarily always arbitrary, particularly so for the occupation 
movements, nevertheless does not constitute the priority of the engagement. While 
symbolic meanings and histories associated with the territories of action usually exist, 
what constitutes the core of the action is not the material (re-)seizure of the space but 
the forms of sociality enacted there. This also relates to the second point, whereby 
whether the endeavor of saving the space has succeeded or failed does not count as a 
criterion for the success of the action as a whole. Even when the state succeeds in 
scattering the territory, what it disrupts is the endurance of the experimentation, rather 
than its succession. The processes that “re-cast territory as a tool of political praxis 
produced and contested through relations” (Ince, 2012:1646, emphasis original), initiate 
a conceptualization of success that preexists state’s intrusion. Since success is defined 
through the process, which preexists confrontation, in other words, the seizure of the 
territory by the state does not mean failure. The territory, in having its significance from 
the relations, the form of sociality experienced there, could easily be enacted 
somewhere else, which is not the case for nation-state rhetoric. 
Because actions within the prefiguration frame are not taken towards the future, 
but rather aim to revolutionize the present, emerging forms of violent confrontations are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The emerging resistant violence still has the potential for the reproduction 
“boring violence of the everyday”, which is discussed in further detail in the 
following section. 
 
30 The form of territory evoked bears remarkable resemblance to the analysis 
Candan & Kolluoglu (2008), where, adopting the term from Augé (1995), they 
define gated communities as “non-places”: “non-places; that is, places that lack 
history, do not have distinguishable markers of identity, and perhaps more 
importantly are places that can be replicated endlessly in different places” (32, 
emphasis mine). 
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less prone to producing the problems associated with formerly depicted accounts.  As 
instrumental defenses of violence take future as a stable point towards which actions are 
hoped to accumulate, for prefiguration such future does not exist. The prioritization of 
“here and now” over “then and there”, disallows the emergence of violence taken in the 
name of the (unpredictable) future. While here too use of violence is grounded on end-
oriented terms, such disabling, first, provides a shorter time-span for the judgment of 
expediency and necessity. Emerging from immediate contexts, the decision to take part 
in violent confrontations derives from actual conditions, allowing a clearer picture of 
options and their costs. The immediacy, in short, makes it easier to evaluate the risks 
and possible outcomes of the decision to whether to adhere to violent means or not. And 
second, because success is defined through the current experimentations, and not 
through the actions’ contribution to the future, the likelihood of a discursive association 
between radicalness and violence decreases. The understanding of success, in relying on 
actualization of ideals, initiates a different definition of radicalness, which is not 
necessarily located in actions’ capacity to bring about a better future. The focus on 
present, in other words, forestalls the grounds for the emergence of a discursive 
construction of violence as substitution for radicalness. 
 The focus on present and the emphasis on autonomy and anti-oppression also 
provide the grounds for scrutinization of current problems. Due to the multi-faceted 
approach to power, along with the focus on micropolitics, not only possible problems 
associated with violent means have room to be voiced, but more importantly their 
deployment is also open to contestation. Rejecting a unified course of action, 
prefiguration frame allows participants to “collectively define what is or is not 
politically ‘efficient’” (Dupuis-Déri, 2010a:54), or to decide whether efficiency is the 
primary concern. 
As argued in the following section, this does not necessarily mean that violent 
forms remain devoid of problems. However, what is of importance here is the room 
provided for the contestation of problems associated with violence. Differing from the 
argumentations defending violence on future-oriented terms, which tend to construct 
current problems as obstacles to be endured, preferably silently, the emphasis on 
autonomy and micropolitics within prefiguration secures the grounds for voicing 
objections and allows room for alternative, nonviolent means. 
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5.3. Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter has outlined conceptual formations of prefiguration that works 
towards avoiding the problems associated with violent means as well as the problems 
enabled by the ways in which violent means are allowed. The temporal configurations, 
action-orientation, and the emphases on autonomy and micropolitics within 
prefiguration allow for an approach in which neither the opponent, nor its violence is 
presupposed for the course of action. The idea of success within prefiguration further 
allows room for both objections to militant praxis, as well as alternative means. 
Despite the conceptual configurations pointing in the opposite direction, 
however, violence emerging as a contextual by-product may not necessarily remain so. 
Even if prefiguration offers preventive measures for an approach that valorizes violence 
for its own sake, establishes a discursive link between violence and radicalness, and a 
confrontational loop where the actors and the opponents reproduce each other, the risks 
are not necessarily eliminated completely at the empirical level. The problems 
associated with ritualized confrontations such as “hardcore habitus” (Sullivan, 2005a); 
hierarchical divisions of labor; and risk/responsibility management for participants and 
non-participants still have currency within prefiguration frame. Rather than a complete 
dissolution of these problems, which due to the messy nature of politics is not really 
possible anyway, what prefiguration allows is room for the critique of problems. 
Violent confrontations emerging from the context of prefigurative 
experimentations still have a tendency to become a fetishized form of masculinity 
display. “Show of force”, originally generated as explicatory of “an operational tactic of 
intimidation” used by the police forces (Vittrup, 2002, in Peterson, 2006:68), here again 
risks becoming a habitual form, and politics becomes “an encounter between two 
opposed performative entitites” (Jeffrey & Candea, 2006:290). The allurement of the 
“cathartic release and momentary self-indulgence” (Sullivan, 2004:15) may then leave 
the underlying reasonings of violent confrontations aside. It may easily translate to the 
form within confrontational frame, where violent means are valorized over others. The 
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formation of hierarchical orders between means and practices, in turn, collaborate with 
other axis of power. The following anecdotes from OWS in this sense are telling: 
 
   “What is characterized as real struggle is the most militant kind of 
struggle; what is devalued is the areas of care. Jail support is not 
glamorized, not sexy, not like taking to the streets. It’s also very gendered: 
jail support was mostly women” (Holmes & Presto, 2012, quoted in 
Hammond, 2015:303). 
 
   “He remembered being in the Occupy Wall Street kitchen one day, where 
a young woman of color asked a white man to clean the dishes he left in the 
sink. ‘The young white man said to her, ‘You do it, I’m doing important 
work.’ But who’s going to do the important work of washing dishes?’” (Liu, 
2012:79). 
 
And this is not the only form the division of labor that may take. Particularly in 
the cases of severe state violence, a division emerges between those deploying violence 
to open up a space, and those who enjoy the space and then get to define the experience. 
The Tahrir Square Occupation, in stark contrast to its representation within Western 
audiences “as a sort of huge hippy festival” (van de Sande, 2013:236), was not really a 
peaceful “Twitter Revolution”: “Those who tweeted about Tahrir”, Abul-Magd 
strikingly states, “were not the ones who occupied it, fought bloody battles against the 
state thugs on its frontiers, died in it, and made the revolution happen” (2012:565). Yet, 
it was the “westernized, middle-class youth in jeans an T-shirts” who defined the 
movement to the broader public by circulating their own experience and interpretations, 
and not the ones fighting on the front lines, most of which “came from lower classes of 
Cairo”, and “had some form of fighting experience” (ibid.:566). This creates a 
hierarchical division of labor between the militants opening up the space for the 
experimentation, and those who conduct the experimentation; “the former create the 
stage, the latter write most of the play” (Mueller, 2004:146).31 
Albeit in a different form, here too the division of labor mirrors the embedded 
relations of power within the social fabric. In the former case, the militant work’s 
association with masculinity perpetuated gendered hierarchies and “the masculinized 
‘hardness’ that so often dominates the left” (Dixon, 2012:44); in the latter, the division 
of labor perpetuates the disposability of particular bodies over others (Butler, 2004:32-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 This is particularly problematic for those who define the experience may then 
criminalize the militants, which was certainly the case for the “The first 3 days of 
Gezi was fine but then…” rhetoric as well as the flyer mentioned in introduction.  
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8). Knowing that “different axis of power operate and feed each other” is not quite an 
original point to make, this collaboration of intersection is important to underline when 
it is about violence, and thereby of life and death, accordingly when the stakes are high. 
Another problem refers to risk and responsibility management. Despite the 
measures taken by the participants in hopes to allow everyone room for acting within 
their comfort-zones, such as dividing the space and time to fit to the preferred means 
(Albertani, 2010; Dupuis-Déri, 2010a & 2010b; Gelderloos, 2007), such divisions are 
rarely respected by the state and its military forces. While I definitely do not mean to 
align with the position that shifts the responsibility of police violence to the militants, as 
in “provoking police violence and endangering innocent third parties”, 32  the 
anticipation, deriving from experience, of possible scenarios initiate the need to 
consider the responsibilities that participants have towards not only each other, but also 
non-participants. For non-participants who do not have convenient means to assert their 
choices, by which I also mean non-humans including animals and plants, the issue of 
responsibility and risk management becomes even more complicated. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 First, such position affirms the state’s legitimate monopoly on violence. The 
formulation as “provoking” implies the right to violently suppress, whereby the 
police violence is constituted as a rightful, disciplinary reaction to “unruly 
subjects”. The position adopted in this thesis, however, not only rejects the 
legitimacy claims of the state and its violence, but more importantly posits the 
consideration of “the social conditions of the possibility of (resistant) violence” as 
an essential criterion for the allocation of responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
“The trouble is that we have a bad habit, encouraged by 
pedants and sophisticates, of considering happiness as 
something rather stupid. Only pain is intellectual, only evil 
interesting. This is the treason of the artist; a refusal to admit 
the banality of evil, and the terrible boredom of pain.” 
Ursula K. Le Guin, The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas 
 
 
“[A]n affirmation of desire, meaning, mystery and creative 
play – jouissance – as central to the experience and 
possibility of being human; a brave embrace of the logic of 
uncertainty.” 
Sian Sullivan, An Other World is Possible?, 2005b 
 
 
 
This thesis started with problematizing the lack of room for critical 
engagements, which lead to violence/nonviolence binary, which then lead to the 
question of what enables violence/nonviolence binary, and which, finally, lead to the 
ethical reasonings underlying the ways in which violence is allowed or disallowed.  
Chapter 2 looked at the disallowance of violence through arguments of morality 
and efficacy, and argued that nonviolence assumes the legitimacy of the order and the 
state; reduces politics and power to the relations of compassion and convincing between 
individuals; decontextualizes violence and its social conditions of the possibility; and in 
valorizing suffering, risks forming of a sacrificial habitus. Chapter 3, first, traced the 
ethical reasonings for the defense of violence in revolutionary rhetoric, and argued that 
instrumental and end-oriented defenses lack limiting criteria for the commission of 
violence; disable en-route criticism; and constructs a discursive association between 
violence and radicalness. Drawing on current debates, second part of Chapter 3 argued 
that confrontational militant praxis produces a hierarchical order between militant and 
non-militant conducts; contributes to the solidification of oppressive relations; and 
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initiates a sacrificial “hardcore habitus” where suffering becomes affirmative of 
resistant subjectivities.  
The formulation of politics as ontologically dependent on the opponent, and 
valorization of suffering were then identified as common traits for articulations of 
violence and nonviolence. Taking cue from the approach that pays attention to social 
conditions of the possibility of violence, the track of the thesis went towards a frame 
that disabled the conditions for the dependence on the opponent and the affirmative 
function of suffering. Chapter 4 introduced prefiguration as politics of the act, which 
relies on alternative configurations of temporality, instrumentality and power relations. 
Chapter 5, finally, argued that former accounts are incompatible with prefigurative 
politics; that prefiguration offers the conditions for a frame in which the opponent was 
not central, and thereby precluding the construction of suffering as redemptive at the 
conceptual level; and that prefigurative frame allowed room for critical engagements. 
Chapter 5 and the thesis concluded by referring to potential problems not 
eliminated/resolved at the empirical level. 
The unfolding of final chapter and the empirical problems, however, does not 
necessarily make this thesis a futile attempt/failure, for offering a final recipe has never 
been among purposes of this thesis. Apart from the impossibility of an inherently 
coherent, and sterile form of politics, this thesis has exactly ended up with the question 
it has started: room for critical engagements. 
A picture of politics as inherently coherent that encapsulates all aspects of life is 
not only quite impossible (and deadly boring), but also undesirable. It is undesirable, 
because it is productive in the Foucauldian sense, producing knowledges, which are 
armed with the power, the power to discard/subjugate other knowledges, the power to 
form and limit what counts as truth and the true form of life. Applied to politics, the 
beforehand limitations of what forms of action comply with autonomy, for instance, 
becomes itself a restriction undermining autonomy. Taken in its broader sense, 
autonomy includes the choice to partake in actions that disallow full enjoyment of 
autonomy. Autonomy for prefiguration, then, does not pre-exist, it is enacted and 
experimented with in the current context. Taken as such, autonomy is an aspiration, a 
tendency worked on, not an absolutist and abstract principle (Alcoff & Alcoff, 
2015:239-240). 
Ideas, ideals, principles, imageries, and accordingly political conduct emerge 
contextually, and are “conditioned and constrained” by the environments surrounding 
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them (Luchies, 2012:2). This necessitates a flexible ground for the definitions of 
political conduct, and an insistent reflection on the dynamicity of meanings associated 
with them. The adherence to principles, in short, need not be taken as strict guidelines to 
follow, but as aspirations. Mistaking principles and aspirations for absolutisms may 
produce scenarios like this one, worthy of a long quotation: 
   “In the classical left and/or anarchist world imaginations of the Western 
activists, […] Cola Cola has a different representative power. Coca Cola is 
not only the symbol of American imperialism, but at the same time it 
represents capitalism’s colonization of everyday life and its construction of 
new addictions through the ideology of consumption. To refuse to drink 
Cola Cola is imagined not only as a symbolic resistance but also a practical 
one. For example, in anti-globalization forums to drink mate –the traditional 
herb tea of South America- instead of Coca Cola has become a signifier of 
alternativeness. Western activists who have been equipped with such 
imaginations were shocked to see the abundant consumption of Coca Cola 
when they came to second ‘inter-galaxies’ meeting organized by the 
Zapatistas in July 2007. They even expressed the discomfort they felt. The 
response of Subcomandante Marcos of The Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) was something like: ‘Because water has been privatized 
in Mexico its price is 10 pesos. Coca Cola, on the other hand, because it is 
being imported from USA as a product backed by the American capital, is 
sold for 6 pesos, meaning Coca Cola is cheaper than water. How can I tell 
the indigenous people to drink water instead of Coca Cola? Moreover, to 
criticize Zapatistas who are all struggling to construct alternative modes of 
production, solely for their consumption preferences, to attempt to teach 
them a lesson on morals, is a great disrespect!’” (Gambetti, 2009:11). 
 
Implied in the anecdote above is the assumption of a positional superiority, 
similar to the one in nonviolence. More interesting is the colonial residues embedded in 
colonialism’s critique; it is an understanding that operates through “whatever is right for 
me should be universally applicable”. The reduced form of anti-capitalist politics as 
“refusing to consume Coca Cola” is a perfect example of the absolutism and formalism 
that this thesis has strived to undermine. Enabled by the (desperately destined to be 
failed) expectations of a sterile, stable, and universal politics, the obsession on form 
reduces the contextual formation of amorphous contents and risks subjugating 
alternative modes and modalities, such as one in which consuming Coca Cola is not 
decisively antagonistic to radical politics.33 
The reason I am talking about these at length is because a similar formalism may 
emerge from the emphasis of this thesis on the “disregard for the state”, deriving from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Comandante Marcos has also hilariously said, “We have a way to get rid of 
Coke, we will drink every last bottle”.  
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the endeavor to move beyond the “dependence on the opponent”. The disregard for the 
state, however, should also be taken as an aspiration, one that would not necessarily 
challenge the integrity of the act when not satisfied. Feminists, for instance, have come 
up with ways to manage state-less aspirations in state-d settings, inspired by an 
understanding of “principled pragmatism” (Maiguascha, 2011). Rather than constituting 
state as a monolithic entity to be destroyed, inverting the parasitical relationship, they 
adopt forms and strategies to situate state as an instrument to be exploited for their 
purposes. This refers to a conscious formation of a context-bound relationship with the 
state, and yet managing to produce measures for “maintaining integrity and critical 
stance” (Siltanen et al., 2015:263). CrimethInc Ex-Workers’ Collective, in “No Gods 
and No Masters Degrees” (2007), takes a step further, and offers to turn the (mostly 
unavoidable) relations with the state to infiltrating into the enemy’s ground, whereby a 
Masters Degree translates into an opportunity to exploit the privileges it brings about 
for the revolutionary cause, or becoming a prison guard, for instance, becomes a 
perfectly revolutionary option. This shows that even what this thesis has identified as a 
central problem is not to be considered as an absolutist principle, that creative and/or 
prefigurative ways are possible for the affairs with the state. 
As for prefiguration and violence, I do not mean to contribute to a discursive 
formation that states “if it is prefigurative, it is legitimate”. Since prefiguration is 
defined as enacting the ideal in the present, if ideals are illegitimate –such as 
homophobia-, their enactments would also be illegitimate, however prefigurative. 
Accordingly, arguing that a particular form of action is prefigurative is incapable of 
substituting a coherent defense of violence on its own. Similarly refuting the arguments 
about the prefigurativity of actions would not suffice for defining the use of violence as 
illegitimate, a case still has to be made about why is that case. An act may be 
prefigurative and illegitimate, as it could be legitimate and yet not prefigurative. 
Producing an abstract notion of a determinative relationship between prefiguration and 
legitimacy, in short, is not only not among the aims of this thesis, but also is quite 
contradictory to them. 
This thesis, then, could be read as an attempt to contribute to the literature on 
“politics of resistance” (Maiguascha, 2011), and to move beyond absolutisms, 
producing hierarchies and corroding room for critical engagements by initiating a 
criticism of dogmatic forms of engagements that disregard the messy, contradictory and 
contextual modes in which politics is bound to operate.  
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